Migrate authentication to Better Auth

Replace the hand-rolled JWT auth with Better Auth 1.6.25 httpOnly cookie
sessions, validated against the database on every request so revocation,
bans and role changes take effect immediately.

Backend:
- betterAuth.ts wires the Drizzle adapter, magic links, Google sign-in and
  the admin plugin; auth-schema.ts maps Better Auth's models onto the
  existing `users` table so user IDs and their foreign keys survive intact.
- routes/auth.ts is gone; Better Auth serves the standard endpoints and
  authExt.ts carries the flows it doesn't cover.
- auth.ts shrinks to session resolution and helpers; sessions/revocation in
  dashboard.ts now read and delete `auth_sessions` rows directly.
- Schema adds the Better Auth core + admin columns (email_verified, image,
  banned, ban_reason, ban_expires), with migrations and tests.
- rateLimit.ts resolves client IPs spoof-resistantly: proxy headers are only
  honoured from loopback/RFC1918 peers plus TRUSTED_PROXIES.
- passwordPolicy.ts centralises password validation.
- Bump drizzle-orm, drizzle-kit and better-sqlite3 to versions compatible
  with Better Auth.

Frontend:
- auth-client.ts plus a reworked AuthContext and api/client.ts move to
  cookie-based sessions; no more bearer tokens in requests or middleware.

photo-api:
- Validate Better Auth session cookies against the shared auth_sessions
  table instead of verifying JWTs; JWT_SECRET is no longer needed for user
  auth, and PHOTO_VIEW_SECRET now signs gallery view tokens.

BETTER_AUTH_SECRET and BETTER_AUTH_URL are required in production; the
deprecated JWT_SECRET stays only as the photo-api view-token fallback.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Michilis
2026-07-29 19:07:04 +00:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 4afa5d6fa0
commit 733d2459df
47 changed files with 2430 additions and 1585 deletions
+21 -1
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@@ -50,13 +50,33 @@ DATABASE_URL=./data/spanglish.db
# Use path-style addressing (true for Garage/MinIO). Defaults to true.
# S3_FORCE_PATH_STYLE=true
# JWT Secret (change in production!)
# Better Auth session secret. REQUIRED in production, 32+ characters.
# Generate one with: openssl rand -base64 48
# Rotating it signs everyone out (cookie signatures invalidate).
BETTER_AUTH_SECRET=
# Public site origin Better Auth builds its URLs against (falls back to
# FRONTEND_URL when unset). E.g. https://spanglishcommunity.com
BETTER_AUTH_URL=
# Extra reverse-proxy IP prefixes allowed to set X-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-For
# (comma-separated, e.g. "172.20."). Loopback and RFC1918 ranges are always
# trusted; anything else is treated as a client and rate-limited by its
# actual socket address.
# TRUSTED_PROXIES=
# DEPRECATED: no longer used for API auth (Better Auth replaced the JWTs).
# Still read by photo-api as the fallback secret for gallery view tokens
# until PHOTO_VIEW_SECRET is set there; safe to remove after that.
JWT_SECRET=your-super-secret-key-change-in-production
# Google OAuth (optional - for Google Sign-In)
# Get your Client ID from: https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/credentials
# Note: The same Client ID should be used in frontend/.env
GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID=
# Only needed for the redirect OAuth flow; the Google Identity Services
# button (ID token sign-in) works with the Client ID alone.
GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=
# Server Configuration
PORT=3001
+4 -3
View File
@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
"@hono/zod-openapi": "^0.14.4",
"argon2": "^0.44.0",
"bcryptjs": "^2.4.3",
"better-sqlite3": "^11.0.0",
"better-auth": "1.6.25",
"better-sqlite3": "^12.11.1",
"dotenv": "^17.2.3",
"drizzle-orm": "^0.31.2",
"drizzle-orm": "^0.45.2",
"hono": "^4.4.7",
"ioredis": "^5.11.1",
"jose": "^5.4.0",
@@ -42,7 +43,7 @@
"@types/pdfkit": "^0.17.4",
"@types/pg": "^8.11.6",
"@types/qrcode": "^1.5.6",
"drizzle-kit": "^0.22.8",
"drizzle-kit": "^0.31.10",
"ioredis-mock": "^8.13.1",
"tsx": "^4.15.7",
"typescript": "^5.5.2",
+200
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
import { sqliteTable, text, integer, customType as sqliteCustomType } from 'drizzle-orm/sqlite-core';
import {
pgTable,
uuid,
varchar,
text as pgText,
timestamp,
boolean as pgBoolean,
bigint,
customType as pgCustomType,
} from 'drizzle-orm/pg-core';
// Better Auth table definitions for both dialects.
//
// The `user` model maps onto the EXISTING `users` table so user IDs (and every
// foreign key that references them) survive the auth migration untouched. Only
// the columns Better Auth reads/writes are declared here; legacy columns
// (password, google_id, token_version) stay physically present but invisible
// to Better Auth. The full application-facing definition lives in schema.ts —
// two Drizzle table objects can safely describe the same SQL table.
const dbType = process.env.DB_TYPE || 'sqlite';
// Better Auth hands the adapter JS Date objects, but the legacy sqlite `users`
// timestamps are ISO-8601 TEXT columns. Bridge the two representations.
const isoText = sqliteCustomType<{ data: Date; driverData: string }>({
dataType() {
return 'text';
},
toDriver(value: Date): string {
return (value instanceof Date ? value : new Date(value)).toISOString();
},
fromDriver(value: string): Date {
return new Date(value);
},
});
// Legacy pg `users.is_claimed` is an INTEGER 0/1 column; expose it as boolean.
const pgIntBool = pgCustomType<{ data: boolean; driverData: number }>({
dataType() {
return 'integer';
},
toDriver(value: boolean): number {
return value ? 1 : 0;
},
fromDriver(value: number | boolean): boolean {
return Boolean(value);
},
});
// ==================== SQLite ====================
export const sqliteAuthUsers = sqliteTable('users', {
id: text('id').primaryKey(),
name: text('name').notNull(),
email: text('email').notNull().unique(),
emailVerified: integer('email_verified', { mode: 'boolean' }).notNull().default(false),
image: text('image'),
createdAt: isoText('created_at').notNull(),
updatedAt: isoText('updated_at').notNull(),
// admin plugin fields
role: text('role').notNull().default('user'),
banned: integer('banned', { mode: 'boolean' }).notNull().default(false),
banReason: text('ban_reason'),
banExpires: integer('ban_expires', { mode: 'timestamp_ms' }),
// application additionalFields
phone: text('phone'),
languagePreference: text('language_preference'),
rucNumber: text('ruc_number'),
isClaimed: integer('is_claimed', { mode: 'boolean' }).notNull().default(true),
accountStatus: text('account_status').notNull().default('active'),
});
export const sqliteAuthSessions = sqliteTable('auth_sessions', {
id: text('id').primaryKey(),
userId: text('user_id')
.notNull()
.references(() => sqliteAuthUsers.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
token: text('token').notNull().unique(),
expiresAt: integer('expires_at', { mode: 'timestamp_ms' }).notNull(),
ipAddress: text('ip_address'),
userAgent: text('user_agent'),
// admin plugin (impersonation)
impersonatedBy: text('impersonated_by'),
createdAt: integer('created_at', { mode: 'timestamp_ms' }).notNull(),
updatedAt: integer('updated_at', { mode: 'timestamp_ms' }).notNull(),
});
export const sqliteAuthAccounts = sqliteTable('auth_accounts', {
id: text('id').primaryKey(),
userId: text('user_id')
.notNull()
.references(() => sqliteAuthUsers.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
accountId: text('account_id').notNull(),
providerId: text('provider_id').notNull(),
accessToken: text('access_token'),
refreshToken: text('refresh_token'),
idToken: text('id_token'),
accessTokenExpiresAt: integer('access_token_expires_at', { mode: 'timestamp_ms' }),
refreshTokenExpiresAt: integer('refresh_token_expires_at', { mode: 'timestamp_ms' }),
scope: text('scope'),
password: text('password'),
createdAt: integer('created_at', { mode: 'timestamp_ms' }).notNull(),
updatedAt: integer('updated_at', { mode: 'timestamp_ms' }).notNull(),
});
export const sqliteAuthVerifications = sqliteTable('auth_verifications', {
id: text('id').primaryKey(),
identifier: text('identifier').notNull(),
value: text('value').notNull(),
expiresAt: integer('expires_at', { mode: 'timestamp_ms' }).notNull(),
createdAt: integer('created_at', { mode: 'timestamp_ms' }).notNull(),
updatedAt: integer('updated_at', { mode: 'timestamp_ms' }).notNull(),
});
export const sqliteAuthRateLimits = sqliteTable('auth_rate_limits', {
id: text('id').primaryKey(),
key: text('key'),
count: integer('count'),
lastRequest: integer('last_request'),
});
// ==================== PostgreSQL ====================
export const pgAuthUsers = pgTable('users', {
id: uuid('id').primaryKey(),
name: varchar('name', { length: 255 }).notNull(),
email: varchar('email', { length: 255 }).notNull().unique(),
emailVerified: pgBoolean('email_verified').notNull().default(false),
image: pgText('image'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').notNull(),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at').notNull(),
// admin plugin fields
role: varchar('role', { length: 20 }).notNull().default('user'),
banned: pgBoolean('banned').notNull().default(false),
banReason: pgText('ban_reason'),
banExpires: timestamp('ban_expires'),
// application additionalFields
phone: varchar('phone', { length: 50 }),
languagePreference: varchar('language_preference', { length: 10 }),
rucNumber: varchar('ruc_number', { length: 15 }),
isClaimed: pgIntBool('is_claimed').notNull(),
accountStatus: varchar('account_status', { length: 20 }).notNull().default('active'),
});
export const pgAuthSessions = pgTable('auth_sessions', {
id: uuid('id').primaryKey(),
userId: uuid('user_id')
.notNull()
.references(() => pgAuthUsers.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
token: varchar('token', { length: 255 }).notNull().unique(),
expiresAt: timestamp('expires_at').notNull(),
ipAddress: varchar('ip_address', { length: 45 }),
userAgent: pgText('user_agent'),
// admin plugin (impersonation)
impersonatedBy: uuid('impersonated_by'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').notNull(),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at').notNull(),
});
export const pgAuthAccounts = pgTable('auth_accounts', {
id: uuid('id').primaryKey(),
userId: uuid('user_id')
.notNull()
.references(() => pgAuthUsers.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
accountId: varchar('account_id', { length: 255 }).notNull(),
providerId: varchar('provider_id', { length: 100 }).notNull(),
accessToken: pgText('access_token'),
refreshToken: pgText('refresh_token'),
idToken: pgText('id_token'),
accessTokenExpiresAt: timestamp('access_token_expires_at'),
refreshTokenExpiresAt: timestamp('refresh_token_expires_at'),
scope: pgText('scope'),
password: pgText('password'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').notNull(),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at').notNull(),
});
export const pgAuthVerifications = pgTable('auth_verifications', {
id: uuid('id').primaryKey(),
identifier: varchar('identifier', { length: 255 }).notNull(),
value: pgText('value').notNull(),
expiresAt: timestamp('expires_at').notNull(),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').notNull(),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at').notNull(),
});
export const pgAuthRateLimits = pgTable('auth_rate_limits', {
id: varchar('id', { length: 64 }).primaryKey(),
key: varchar('key', { length: 255 }),
count: bigint('count', { mode: 'number' }),
lastRequest: bigint('last_request', { mode: 'number' }),
});
// ==================== Runtime-switched exports ====================
export const authUsers = dbType === 'postgres' ? pgAuthUsers : sqliteAuthUsers;
export const authSessions = dbType === 'postgres' ? pgAuthSessions : sqliteAuthSessions;
export const authAccounts = dbType === 'postgres' ? pgAuthAccounts : sqliteAuthAccounts;
export const authVerifications = dbType === 'postgres' ? pgAuthVerifications : sqliteAuthVerifications;
export const authRateLimits = dbType === 'postgres' ? pgAuthRateLimits : sqliteAuthRateLimits;
+100
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@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll } from 'vitest';
import { execFileSync } from 'child_process';
import { mkdtempSync } from 'fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'os';
import { join } from 'path';
import Database from 'better-sqlite3';
// Migration idempotency for the Better Auth backfill: seed legacy-shaped user
// rows, run migrate repeatedly, and assert the backfill is correct and never
// duplicates.
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'ba-migrate-test-'));
const dbPath = join(dir, 'migrate.db');
function runMigrate() {
execFileSync('npx', ['tsx', 'src/db/migrate.ts'], {
env: {
...process.env,
DB_TYPE: 'sqlite',
DATABASE_URL: dbPath,
REDIS_URL: '',
},
stdio: 'pipe',
});
}
let db: Database.Database;
beforeAll(() => {
// First run creates the schema
runMigrate();
db = new Database(dbPath);
// Seed legacy-shaped users (pre-Better-Auth): password lives on users,
// google_id links Google, '' marks guest accounts, suspended via status.
const now = new Date().toISOString();
const insert = db.prepare(
`INSERT INTO users (id, email, password, name, role, is_claimed, google_id, account_status, token_version, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 0, ?, ?)`
);
insert.run('legacy-argon', 'argon@old.py', '$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=4$fake', 'Argon', 'user', 1, null, 'active', now, now);
insert.run('legacy-bcrypt', 'bcrypt@old.py', '$2a$10$fakebcryptfakebcryptfakebc', 'Bcrypt', 'admin', 1, null, 'active', now, now);
insert.run('legacy-guest', 'guest@old.py', '', 'Guest', 'user', 1, null, 'active', now, now);
insert.run('legacy-google', 'google@old.py', null, 'Google', 'user', 1, 'google-sub-123', 'active', now, now);
insert.run('legacy-both', 'both@old.py', '$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=4$fake2', 'Both', 'user', 1, 'google-sub-456', 'active', now, now);
insert.run('legacy-suspended', 'suspended@old.py', '$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=4$fake3', 'Bad', 'user', 1, null, 'suspended', now, now);
// Second run performs the backfill against the seeded rows
runMigrate();
}, 240_000);
describe('Better Auth migration backfill', () => {
it('creates credential accounts for users with real passwords only', () => {
const rows = db
.prepare("SELECT user_id, password FROM auth_accounts WHERE provider_id = 'credential' ORDER BY user_id")
.all() as any[];
const byUser = new Map(rows.map((r) => [r.user_id, r.password]));
expect(byUser.get('legacy-argon')).toContain('$argon2id$');
expect(byUser.get('legacy-bcrypt')).toContain('$2a$');
expect(byUser.get('legacy-both')).toContain('$argon2id$');
expect(byUser.get('legacy-suspended')).toBeTruthy();
// Guests ('' password) and Google-only users get no credential account
expect(byUser.has('legacy-guest')).toBe(false);
expect(byUser.has('legacy-google')).toBe(false);
});
it('creates google accounts from google_id', () => {
const rows = db
.prepare("SELECT user_id, account_id FROM auth_accounts WHERE provider_id = 'google' ORDER BY user_id")
.all() as any[];
expect(rows).toEqual([
{ user_id: 'legacy-both', account_id: 'google-sub-456' },
{ user_id: 'legacy-google', account_id: 'google-sub-123' },
]);
});
it('marks claimed legacy users email-verified, guests not', () => {
const verified = (email: string) =>
(db.prepare('SELECT email_verified FROM users WHERE email = ?').get(email) as any).email_verified;
expect(verified('argon@old.py')).toBe(1);
expect(verified('google@old.py')).toBe(1);
expect(verified('guest@old.py')).toBe(0);
});
it('mirrors suspended accounts to banned', () => {
const row = db.prepare('SELECT banned, ban_reason FROM users WHERE email = ?').get('suspended@old.py') as any;
expect(row.banned).toBe(1);
expect(row.ban_reason).toContain('suspended');
const active = db.prepare('SELECT banned FROM users WHERE email = ?').get('argon@old.py') as any;
expect(active.banned).toBe(0);
});
it('is idempotent: a third run adds nothing', () => {
const count = () => (db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM auth_accounts').get() as any).n;
const before = count();
runMigrate();
expect(count()).toBe(before);
}, 60_000);
});
+229
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@@ -544,6 +544,81 @@ async function migrate() {
updated_by TEXT REFERENCES users(id)
)
`);
// ==================== Better Auth ====================
// Better Auth core + admin plugin columns on the existing users table
try {
await (db as any).run(sql`ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN email_verified INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0`);
} catch (e) { /* column may already exist */ }
try {
await (db as any).run(sql`ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN image TEXT`);
} catch (e) { /* column may already exist */ }
try {
await (db as any).run(sql`ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN banned INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0`);
} catch (e) { /* column may already exist */ }
try {
await (db as any).run(sql`ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN ban_reason TEXT`);
} catch (e) { /* column may already exist */ }
try {
await (db as any).run(sql`ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN ban_expires INTEGER`);
} catch (e) { /* column may already exist */ }
// Better Auth sessions (replaces the legacy user_sessions table).
// Timestamps are integer epoch-milliseconds (Drizzle timestamp_ms mode).
await (db as any).run(sql`
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_sessions (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
user_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
token TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
expires_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
ip_address TEXT,
user_agent TEXT,
impersonated_by TEXT,
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL
)
`);
// Better Auth accounts: credential (password hash) and OAuth provider links
await (db as any).run(sql`
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_accounts (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
user_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
provider_id TEXT NOT NULL,
access_token TEXT,
refresh_token TEXT,
id_token TEXT,
access_token_expires_at INTEGER,
refresh_token_expires_at INTEGER,
scope TEXT,
password TEXT,
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL
)
`);
// Better Auth verification values (magic links, password reset tokens)
await (db as any).run(sql`
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_verifications (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
identifier TEXT NOT NULL,
value TEXT NOT NULL,
expires_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL
)
`);
// Better Auth rate limiting (used when Redis is not configured)
await (db as any).run(sql`
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_rate_limits (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
key TEXT,
count INTEGER,
last_request INTEGER
)
`);
} else {
// PostgreSQL migrations
await (db as any).execute(sql`
@@ -1044,6 +1119,80 @@ async function migrate() {
updated_by UUID REFERENCES users(id)
)
`);
// ==================== Better Auth ====================
// Better Auth core + admin plugin columns on the existing users table
try {
await (db as any).execute(sql`ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS email_verified BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE`);
} catch (e) { /* column may already exist */ }
try {
await (db as any).execute(sql`ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS image TEXT`);
} catch (e) { /* column may already exist */ }
try {
await (db as any).execute(sql`ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS banned BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE`);
} catch (e) { /* column may already exist */ }
try {
await (db as any).execute(sql`ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS ban_reason TEXT`);
} catch (e) { /* column may already exist */ }
try {
await (db as any).execute(sql`ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS ban_expires TIMESTAMP`);
} catch (e) { /* column may already exist */ }
// Better Auth sessions (replaces the legacy user_sessions table)
await (db as any).execute(sql`
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_sessions (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
token VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
expires_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
ip_address VARCHAR(45),
user_agent TEXT,
impersonated_by UUID,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
updated_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL
)
`);
// Better Auth accounts: credential (password hash) and OAuth provider links
await (db as any).execute(sql`
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_accounts (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
account_id VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
provider_id VARCHAR(100) NOT NULL,
access_token TEXT,
refresh_token TEXT,
id_token TEXT,
access_token_expires_at TIMESTAMP,
refresh_token_expires_at TIMESTAMP,
scope TEXT,
password TEXT,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
updated_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL
)
`);
// Better Auth verification values (magic links, password reset tokens)
await (db as any).execute(sql`
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_verifications (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
identifier VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
value TEXT NOT NULL,
expires_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
updated_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL
)
`);
// Better Auth rate limiting (used when Redis is not configured)
await (db as any).execute(sql`
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_rate_limits (
id VARCHAR(64) PRIMARY KEY,
key VARCHAR(255),
count BIGINT,
last_request BIGINT
)
`);
}
// Indexes on foreign-key / hot-filter columns (CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS works on both engines)
@@ -1056,6 +1205,11 @@ async function migrate() {
`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS payments_status_idx ON payments(status)`,
`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS email_logs_event_id_idx ON email_logs(event_id)`,
`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS magic_link_tokens_token_idx ON magic_link_tokens(token)`,
`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS auth_sessions_user_id_idx ON auth_sessions(user_id)`,
`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS auth_accounts_user_id_idx ON auth_accounts(user_id)`,
`CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS auth_accounts_provider_account_idx ON auth_accounts(provider_id, account_id)`,
`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS auth_verifications_identifier_idx ON auth_verifications(identifier)`,
`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS auth_rate_limits_key_idx ON auth_rate_limits(key)`,
];
for (const stmt of indexStatements) {
try {
@@ -1067,6 +1221,81 @@ async function migrate() {
} catch (e) { /* index may already exist */ }
}
// ==================== Better Auth data backfill ====================
// Idempotent: every statement is guarded so re-running migrate is safe, and
// legacy users are distinguished from Better-Auth-created users by having
// users.password / users.google_id set (Better Auth never writes either).
if (dbType === 'sqlite') {
// Legacy password hashes -> credential accounts (argon2 and bcrypt hashes
// both stay valid via the custom password verifier in lib/betterAuth.ts)
await (db as any).run(sql`
INSERT INTO auth_accounts (id, user_id, account_id, provider_id, password, created_at, updated_at)
SELECT lower(hex(randomblob(16))), u.id, u.id, 'credential', u.password,
CAST(strftime('%s','now') AS INTEGER) * 1000, CAST(strftime('%s','now') AS INTEGER) * 1000
FROM users u
WHERE u.password IS NOT NULL AND u.password != ''
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM auth_accounts a WHERE a.user_id = u.id AND a.provider_id = 'credential'
)
`);
// Legacy Google links -> google provider accounts
await (db as any).run(sql`
INSERT INTO auth_accounts (id, user_id, account_id, provider_id, created_at, updated_at)
SELECT lower(hex(randomblob(16))), u.id, u.google_id, 'google',
CAST(strftime('%s','now') AS INTEGER) * 1000, CAST(strftime('%s','now') AS INTEGER) * 1000
FROM users u
WHERE u.google_id IS NOT NULL AND u.google_id != ''
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM auth_accounts a WHERE a.user_id = u.id AND a.provider_id = 'google'
)
`);
// Claimed legacy accounts proved their email (register/claim link/Google)
await (db as any).run(sql`
UPDATE users SET email_verified = 1
WHERE email_verified = 0 AND is_claimed = 1
AND ((password IS NOT NULL AND password != '') OR google_id IS NOT NULL)
`);
// Suspended -> banned (admin plugin field); users.ts keeps them in sync
await (db as any).run(sql`
UPDATE users SET banned = 1, ban_reason = 'migrated: account suspended'
WHERE account_status = 'suspended' AND banned = 0
`);
} else {
await (db as any).execute(sql`
INSERT INTO auth_accounts (id, user_id, account_id, provider_id, password, created_at, updated_at)
SELECT gen_random_uuid(), u.id, u.id::text, 'credential', u.password, NOW(), NOW()
FROM users u
WHERE u.password IS NOT NULL AND u.password != ''
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM auth_accounts a WHERE a.user_id = u.id AND a.provider_id = 'credential'
)
`);
await (db as any).execute(sql`
INSERT INTO auth_accounts (id, user_id, account_id, provider_id, created_at, updated_at)
SELECT gen_random_uuid(), u.id, u.google_id, 'google', NOW(), NOW()
FROM users u
WHERE u.google_id IS NOT NULL AND u.google_id != ''
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM auth_accounts a WHERE a.user_id = u.id AND a.provider_id = 'google'
)
`);
await (db as any).execute(sql`
UPDATE users SET email_verified = TRUE
WHERE email_verified = FALSE AND is_claimed = 1
AND ((password IS NOT NULL AND password != '') OR google_id IS NOT NULL)
`);
await (db as any).execute(sql`
UPDATE users SET banned = TRUE, ban_reason = 'migrated: account suspended'
WHERE account_status = 'suspended' AND banned = FALSE
`);
}
// Backfill slugs for any events that don't have one yet (shared across DB types).
// Ordered by creation so duplicate titles get deterministic -2, -3 suffixes.
const allEvents = await dbAll<{ id: string; title: string; slug: string | null }>(
+13 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { sqliteTable, text, integer, real } from 'drizzle-orm/sqlite-core';
import { pgTable, uuid, varchar, text as pgText, timestamp, decimal, integer as pgInteger } from 'drizzle-orm/pg-core';
import { pgTable, uuid, varchar, text as pgText, timestamp, decimal, integer as pgInteger, boolean as pgBoolean } from 'drizzle-orm/pg-core';
// Type to determine which schema to use
const dbType = process.env.DB_TYPE || 'sqlite';
@@ -20,6 +20,12 @@ export const sqliteUsers = sqliteTable('users', {
accountStatus: text('account_status', { enum: ['active', 'unclaimed', 'suspended'] }).notNull().default('active'),
// Incremented to invalidate previously issued JWTs (logout-everywhere, password change/reset)
tokenVersion: integer('token_version').notNull().default(0),
// Better Auth core + admin plugin fields (auth-schema.ts maps the same columns)
emailVerified: integer('email_verified', { mode: 'boolean' }).notNull().default(false),
image: text('image'),
banned: integer('banned', { mode: 'boolean' }).notNull().default(false),
banReason: text('ban_reason'),
banExpires: integer('ban_expires', { mode: 'timestamp_ms' }),
createdAt: text('created_at').notNull(),
updatedAt: text('updated_at').notNull(),
});
@@ -380,6 +386,12 @@ export const pgUsers = pgTable('users', {
accountStatus: varchar('account_status', { length: 20 }).notNull().default('active'),
// Incremented to invalidate previously issued JWTs (logout-everywhere, password change/reset)
tokenVersion: pgInteger('token_version').notNull().default(0),
// Better Auth core + admin plugin fields (auth-schema.ts maps the same columns)
emailVerified: pgBoolean('email_verified').notNull().default(false),
image: pgText('image'),
banned: pgBoolean('banned').notNull().default(false),
banReason: pgText('ban_reason'),
banExpires: timestamp('ban_expires'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').notNull(),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at').notNull(),
});
+132 -124
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@ import { logger } from 'hono/logger';
import { swaggerUI } from '@hono/swagger-ui';
import { serveStatic } from '@hono/node-server/serve-static';
import authRoutes from './routes/auth.js';
import { auth } from './lib/betterAuth.js';
import authExtRoutes from './routes/authExt.js';
import { getClientIp } from './lib/rateLimit.js';
import eventsRoutes from './routes/events.js';
import ticketsRoutes from './routes/tickets.js';
import usersRoutes from './routes/users.js';
@@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ app.use(
if (!origin) return frontendUrl;
return allowedOrigins.has(origin) ? origin : null;
},
// We use bearer tokens, but keeping credentials=true matches nginx config.
// Session cookies must be allowed on cross-origin API calls (api.* vhost).
credentials: true,
})
);
@@ -110,11 +112,15 @@ const openApiSpec = {
],
paths: {
// ==================== Auth Endpoints ====================
'/api/auth/register': {
// Authentication is handled by Better Auth, mounted at /api/auth/*.
// Sessions are httpOnly cookies (spanglish.session_token); the endpoints
// below are the subset the frontend uses. See https://better-auth.com/docs
// for the full endpoint reference.
'/api/auth/sign-up/email': {
post: {
tags: ['Auth'],
summary: 'Register a new user',
description: 'Create a new user account. First registered user becomes admin. Password must be at least 10 characters.',
summary: 'Register a new user (Better Auth)',
description: 'Create a user account and start a cookie session. First registered user becomes admin. Password policy: 10-128 chars, upper+lower+digit-or-symbol, common passwords rejected.',
requestBody: {
required: true,
content: {
@@ -124,8 +130,8 @@ const openApiSpec = {
required: ['email', 'password', 'name'],
properties: {
email: { type: 'string', format: 'email' },
password: { type: 'string', minLength: 10, description: 'Minimum 10 characters' },
name: { type: 'string', minLength: 2 },
password: { type: 'string', minLength: 10 },
name: { type: 'string' },
phone: { type: 'string' },
languagePreference: { type: 'string', enum: ['en', 'es'] },
},
@@ -134,16 +140,17 @@ const openApiSpec = {
},
},
responses: {
201: { description: 'User created successfully' },
400: { description: 'Email already registered or validation error' },
200: { description: 'User created; session cookie set' },
422: { description: 'Email already registered' },
400: { description: 'Validation error' },
},
},
},
'/api/auth/login': {
'/api/auth/sign-in/email': {
post: {
tags: ['Auth'],
summary: 'Login with email and password',
description: 'Authenticate user with email and password. Rate limited to 5 attempts per 15 minutes.',
summary: 'Login with email and password (Better Auth)',
description: 'Starts a cookie session. Per-email lockout: 5 failures / 15 min. Per-IP rate limited.',
requestBody: {
required: true,
content: {
@@ -160,42 +167,46 @@ const openApiSpec = {
},
},
responses: {
200: { description: 'Login successful, returns JWT token' },
200: { description: 'Login successful; session cookie set' },
401: { description: 'Invalid credentials' },
429: { description: 'Too many login attempts' },
429: { description: 'Too many attempts' },
},
},
},
'/api/auth/google': {
'/api/auth/sign-in/social': {
post: {
tags: ['Auth'],
summary: 'Login or register with Google',
description: 'Authenticate using Google OAuth. Creates account if user does not exist.',
summary: 'Login or register with Google (Better Auth)',
description: 'Sign in with a Google ID token (Google Identity Services credential). Links to an existing account by verified email.',
requestBody: {
required: true,
content: {
'application/json': {
schema: {
type: 'object',
required: ['credential'],
required: ['provider'],
properties: {
credential: { type: 'string', description: 'Google ID token' },
provider: { type: 'string', enum: ['google'] },
idToken: {
type: 'object',
properties: { token: { type: 'string', description: 'Google ID token' } },
},
},
},
},
},
},
responses: {
200: { description: 'Login successful' },
400: { description: 'Invalid Google token' },
200: { description: 'Login successful; session cookie set' },
401: { description: 'Invalid Google token' },
},
},
},
'/api/auth/magic-link/request': {
'/api/auth/sign-in/magic-link': {
post: {
tags: ['Auth'],
summary: 'Request magic link login',
description: 'Send a one-time login link to email. Link expires in 10 minutes.',
summary: 'Request magic link login (Better Auth)',
description: 'Emails a one-time login link (10 min TTL, single use, hashed at rest). Does not create accounts.',
requestBody: {
required: true,
content: {
@@ -205,46 +216,33 @@ const openApiSpec = {
required: ['email'],
properties: {
email: { type: 'string', format: 'email' },
callbackURL: { type: 'string' },
},
},
},
},
},
responses: {
200: { description: 'Magic link sent (if account exists)' },
},
responses: { 200: { description: 'Magic link sent (if account exists)' } },
},
},
'/api/auth/magic-link/verify': {
post: {
get: {
tags: ['Auth'],
summary: 'Verify magic link token',
description: 'Verify the magic link token and login user.',
requestBody: {
required: true,
content: {
'application/json': {
schema: {
type: 'object',
required: ['token'],
properties: {
token: { type: 'string' },
},
},
},
},
},
summary: 'Verify magic link token (Better Auth)',
parameters: [
{ name: 'token', in: 'query', required: true, schema: { type: 'string' } },
],
responses: {
200: { description: 'Login successful' },
200: { description: 'Login successful; session cookie set' },
400: { description: 'Invalid or expired token' },
},
},
},
'/api/auth/password-reset/request': {
'/api/auth/request-password-reset': {
post: {
tags: ['Auth'],
summary: 'Request password reset',
description: 'Send a password reset link to email. Link expires in 30 minutes.',
summary: 'Request password reset (Better Auth)',
description: 'Emails a reset link. Token expires in 30 minutes.',
requestBody: {
required: true,
content: {
@@ -254,31 +252,30 @@ const openApiSpec = {
required: ['email'],
properties: {
email: { type: 'string', format: 'email' },
redirectTo: { type: 'string' },
},
},
},
},
},
responses: {
200: { description: 'Reset link sent (if account exists)' },
},
responses: { 200: { description: 'Reset link sent (if account exists)' } },
},
},
'/api/auth/password-reset/confirm': {
'/api/auth/reset-password': {
post: {
tags: ['Auth'],
summary: 'Confirm password reset',
description: 'Reset password using the token from email.',
summary: 'Reset password with token (Better Auth)',
description: 'Sets a new password and revokes all existing sessions.',
requestBody: {
required: true,
content: {
'application/json': {
schema: {
type: 'object',
required: ['token', 'password'],
required: ['newPassword', 'token'],
properties: {
newPassword: { type: 'string', minLength: 10 },
token: { type: 'string' },
password: { type: 'string', minLength: 10 },
},
},
},
@@ -290,62 +287,10 @@ const openApiSpec = {
},
},
},
'/api/auth/claim-account/request': {
post: {
tags: ['Auth'],
summary: 'Request account claim link',
description: 'For unclaimed accounts created during booking. Link expires in 24 hours.',
requestBody: {
required: true,
content: {
'application/json': {
schema: {
type: 'object',
required: ['email'],
properties: {
email: { type: 'string', format: 'email' },
},
},
},
},
},
responses: {
200: { description: 'Claim link sent (if unclaimed account exists)' },
},
},
},
'/api/auth/claim-account/confirm': {
post: {
tags: ['Auth'],
summary: 'Confirm account claim',
description: 'Claim an unclaimed account by setting password or linking Google.',
requestBody: {
required: true,
content: {
'application/json': {
schema: {
type: 'object',
required: ['token'],
properties: {
token: { type: 'string' },
password: { type: 'string', minLength: 10, description: 'Required if not linking Google' },
googleId: { type: 'string', description: 'Google ID for OAuth linking' },
},
},
},
},
},
responses: {
200: { description: 'Account claimed successfully' },
400: { description: 'Invalid token or missing credentials' },
},
},
},
'/api/auth/change-password': {
post: {
tags: ['Auth'],
summary: 'Change password',
description: 'Change password for authenticated user.',
summary: 'Change password (Better Auth)',
security: [{ bearerAuth: [] }],
requestBody: {
required: true,
@@ -357,6 +302,7 @@ const openApiSpec = {
properties: {
currentPassword: { type: 'string' },
newPassword: { type: 'string', minLength: 10 },
revokeOtherSessions: { type: 'boolean' },
},
},
},
@@ -369,26 +315,66 @@ const openApiSpec = {
},
},
},
'/api/auth/me': {
'/api/auth/get-session': {
get: {
tags: ['Auth'],
summary: 'Get current user',
description: 'Get the currently authenticated user profile.',
summary: 'Get current session and user (Better Auth)',
security: [{ bearerAuth: [] }],
responses: {
200: { description: 'Current user data' },
401: { description: 'Unauthorized' },
200: { description: '{ session, user } or null when not authenticated' },
},
},
},
'/api/auth/logout': {
'/api/auth/sign-out': {
post: {
tags: ['Auth'],
summary: 'Logout',
description: 'Logout current user (client-side token removal).',
responses: {
200: { description: 'Logged out' },
summary: 'Logout (Better Auth)',
description: 'Revokes the current session and clears the session cookie.',
security: [{ bearerAuth: [] }],
responses: { 200: { description: 'Logged out' } },
},
},
'/api/auth/list-sessions': {
get: {
tags: ['Auth'],
summary: 'List active sessions (Better Auth)',
security: [{ bearerAuth: [] }],
responses: { 200: { description: 'Active sessions for the current user' } },
},
},
'/api/auth-ext/claim-account': {
post: {
tags: ['Auth'],
summary: 'Claim a guest-created account',
description: 'Completes the progressive-account claim: requires a session established via the claim magic link, sets the password, and activates the account.',
security: [{ bearerAuth: [] }],
requestBody: {
required: true,
content: {
'application/json': {
schema: {
type: 'object',
required: ['password'],
properties: { password: { type: 'string', minLength: 10 } },
},
},
},
},
responses: {
200: { description: 'Account claimed successfully' },
400: { description: 'Already claimed or validation error' },
401: { description: 'No session (claim link required)' },
},
},
},
'/api/auth-ext/claim-eligibility': {
get: {
tags: ['Auth'],
summary: 'Check whether an email has an unclaimed account',
parameters: [
{ name: 'email', in: 'query', required: true, schema: { type: 'string', format: 'email' } },
],
responses: { 200: { description: '{ canClaim: boolean }' } },
},
},
@@ -1762,10 +1748,10 @@ const openApiSpec = {
components: {
securitySchemes: {
bearerAuth: {
type: 'http',
scheme: 'bearer',
bearerFormat: 'JWT',
description: 'JWT token obtained from login endpoint',
type: 'apiKey',
in: 'cookie',
name: 'spanglish.session_token',
description: 'Better Auth httpOnly session cookie (set by sign-in; __Secure- prefixed in production)',
},
},
schemas: {
@@ -1899,7 +1885,29 @@ app.get('/health', (c) => {
});
// API Routes
app.route('/api/auth', authRoutes);
// Better Auth handles all /api/auth/* endpoints (sign-in/up/out, magic link,
// password reset, Google, session management). CORS above runs first.
//
// Better Auth only sees the Request (no TCP peer address), so its per-IP rate
// limiting is fed the socket-anchored client IP resolved by getClientIp via a
// private header. The inbound value is always discarded — a client cannot
// choose its own rate-limit bucket.
app.on(['POST', 'GET'], '/api/auth/*', (c) => {
const headers = new Headers(c.req.raw.headers);
headers.delete('x-client-ip');
const clientIp = getClientIp(c);
if (clientIp && clientIp !== 'unknown') {
headers.set('x-client-ip', clientIp);
}
return auth.handler(
new Request(c.req.raw, {
headers,
// Node's fetch requires duplex for requests carrying a body stream
...(c.req.raw.body ? { duplex: 'half' as const } : {}),
} as RequestInit)
);
});
app.route('/api/auth-ext', authExtRoutes);
app.route('/api/events', eventsRoutes);
app.route('/api/tickets', ticketsRoutes);
app.route('/api/users', usersRoutes);
+92 -331
View File
@@ -1,366 +1,127 @@
import * as jose from 'jose';
import * as argon2 from 'argon2';
import bcrypt from 'bcryptjs';
import crypto from 'crypto';
import { Context } from 'hono';
import { db, dbGet, dbAll, users, magicLinkTokens, userSessions } from '../db/index.js';
import { eq, and, gt, sql, isNull } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { generateId, getNow, toDbDate } from './utils.js';
import { and, eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { auth } from './betterAuth.js';
import { db, dbGet } from '../db/index.js';
import { authAccounts } from '../db/auth-schema.js';
const DEFAULT_DEV_JWT_SECRET = 'your-super-secret-key-change-in-production';
const rawJwtSecret = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
// Auth is provided by Better Auth (lib/betterAuth.ts): httpOnly cookie
// sessions validated against the auth_sessions table on every request, so
// revocation (ban/suspend/password reset) applies instantly. This module keeps
// the request-side helpers that the route files use.
// Never allow the insecure default in production: forgeable tokens = full account takeover.
if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production' && (!rawJwtSecret || rawJwtSecret === DEFAULT_DEV_JWT_SECRET)) {
throw new Error('JWT_SECRET must be set to a strong, unique value in production. Refusing to start with the default secret.');
}
if (!rawJwtSecret) {
console.warn('[auth] JWT_SECRET is not set; using an insecure development default. Set JWT_SECRET in production.');
}
// Re-exported for routes that hash/validate passwords outside Better Auth
export { hashPassword, verifyPassword, validatePassword } from './passwordPolicy.js';
const JWT_SECRET = new TextEncoder().encode(rawJwtSecret || DEFAULT_DEV_JWT_SECRET);
const JWT_ISSUER = 'spanglish';
const JWT_AUDIENCE = 'spanglish-app';
export interface JWTPayload {
sub: string;
export interface AuthUser {
id: string;
email: string;
name: string;
phone: string | null;
role: string;
tokenVersion?: number;
iat: number;
exp: number;
languagePreference: string | null;
isClaimed: boolean;
rucNumber: string | null;
accountStatus: string;
emailVerified: boolean;
image: string | null;
createdAt: Date | string;
updatedAt: Date | string;
/** ID of the Better Auth session backing this request. */
sessionId: string;
}
// Password hashing with Argon2 (spec requirement)
export async function hashPassword(password: string): Promise<string> {
return argon2.hash(password, {
type: argon2.argon2id,
memoryCost: 65536, // 64 MB
timeCost: 3,
parallelism: 4,
});
}
export async function verifyPassword(password: string, hash: string): Promise<boolean> {
// Support both bcrypt (legacy) and argon2 hashes for migration
if (hash.startsWith('$argon2')) {
return argon2.verify(hash, password);
}
// Legacy bcrypt support
return bcrypt.compare(password, hash);
}
// Generate secure random token for magic links
export function generateSecureToken(): string {
return crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
}
// Create magic link token
export async function createMagicLinkToken(
userId: string,
type: 'login' | 'reset_password' | 'claim_account' | 'email_verification',
expiresInMinutes: number = 10
): Promise<string> {
const token = generateSecureToken();
const now = getNow();
const expiresAt = toDbDate(new Date(Date.now() + expiresInMinutes * 60 * 1000));
await (db as any).insert(magicLinkTokens).values({
id: generateId(),
userId,
token,
type,
expiresAt,
createdAt: now,
});
return token;
}
// Verify and consume magic link token
export async function verifyMagicLinkToken(
token: string,
type: 'login' | 'reset_password' | 'claim_account' | 'email_verification'
): Promise<{ valid: boolean; userId?: string; error?: string }> {
const now = getNow();
const tokenRecord = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any)
.select()
.from(magicLinkTokens)
.where(
and(
eq((magicLinkTokens as any).token, token),
eq((magicLinkTokens as any).type, type)
)
)
);
// Use a single generic error for all invalid states to avoid leaking token state
const genericError = 'Invalid or expired token';
if (!tokenRecord) {
return { valid: false, error: genericError };
}
if (tokenRecord.usedAt) {
return { valid: false, error: genericError };
}
if (new Date(tokenRecord.expiresAt) < new Date()) {
return { valid: false, error: genericError };
}
// Atomically consume the token: only the request that flips used_at from NULL wins.
// This prevents a double-spend race where two concurrent requests both pass the
// read-time "not used" check above.
const result: any = await (db as any)
.update(magicLinkTokens)
.set({ usedAt: now })
.where(and(
eq((magicLinkTokens as any).id, tokenRecord.id),
isNull((magicLinkTokens as any).usedAt)
));
const affected = result?.changes ?? result?.rowCount ?? 0;
if (affected === 0) {
return { valid: false, error: genericError };
}
return { valid: true, userId: tokenRecord.userId };
}
// Create user session
export async function createUserSession(
userId: string,
userAgent?: string,
ipAddress?: string
): Promise<string> {
const sessionToken = generateSecureToken();
const now = getNow();
const expiresAt = toDbDate(new Date(Date.now() + 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)); // 30 days
await (db as any).insert(userSessions).values({
id: generateId(),
userId,
token: sessionToken,
userAgent: userAgent || null,
ipAddress: ipAddress || null,
lastActiveAt: now,
expiresAt,
createdAt: now,
});
return sessionToken;
}
// Get user's active sessions
export async function getUserSessions(userId: string) {
const now = getNow();
return dbAll(
(db as any)
.select()
.from(userSessions)
.where(
and(
eq((userSessions as any).userId, userId),
gt((userSessions as any).expiresAt, now)
)
)
);
}
// Invalidate a specific session
export async function invalidateSession(sessionId: string, userId: string): Promise<boolean> {
const result = await (db as any)
.delete(userSessions)
.where(
and(
eq((userSessions as any).id, sessionId),
eq((userSessions as any).userId, userId)
)
);
return true;
}
// Invalidate all user sessions (logout everywhere)
export async function invalidateAllUserSessions(userId: string): Promise<void> {
await (db as any)
.delete(userSessions)
.where(eq((userSessions as any).userId, userId));
}
// Small blocklist of common/weak passwords (and obvious app-specific ones).
// Compared case-insensitively after stripping non-alphanumerics so that e.g.
// "P@ssw0rd!" still matches "password".
const COMMON_PASSWORDS = new Set([
'password', 'passw0rd', '123456', '1234567', '12345678', '123456789', '1234567890',
'qwerty', 'qwertyuiop', 'letmein', 'welcome', 'admin', 'administrator', 'iloveyou',
'monkey', 'dragon', 'sunshine', 'princess', 'football', 'baseball', 'abc123',
'spanglish', 'changeme', 'secret', 'master', 'login', 'access',
]);
// Password policy: 10-128 chars, requires a mix of character types, and rejects
// common/weak passwords. Centralized so register/reset/change all share it.
export function validatePassword(password: string): { valid: boolean; error?: string } {
if (password.length < 10) {
return { valid: false, error: 'Password must be at least 10 characters long' };
}
if (password.length > 128) {
return { valid: false, error: 'Password must be at most 128 characters long' };
}
const hasLower = /[a-z]/.test(password);
const hasUpper = /[A-Z]/.test(password);
const hasDigit = /\d/.test(password);
const hasSymbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(password);
// Require lowercase, uppercase, and at least one digit or symbol.
if (!hasLower || !hasUpper || !(hasDigit || hasSymbol)) {
return {
valid: false,
error: 'Password must include uppercase and lowercase letters and at least one number or symbol',
};
}
const normalized = password.toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9]/g, '');
if (COMMON_PASSWORDS.has(normalized)) {
return { valid: false, error: 'Password is too common. Please choose a less guessable password.' };
}
return { valid: true };
}
export async function createToken(userId: string, email: string, role: string, tokenVersion: number = 0): Promise<string> {
const token = await new jose.SignJWT({ sub: userId, email, role, tokenVersion })
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: 'HS256' })
.setIssuedAt()
.setIssuer(JWT_ISSUER)
.setAudience(JWT_AUDIENCE)
.setExpirationTime('1d')
.sign(JWT_SECRET);
return token;
}
// Invalidate all previously issued JWTs for a user (logout-everywhere, password change/reset).
export async function bumpTokenVersion(userId: string): Promise<void> {
await (db as any)
.update(users)
.set({ tokenVersion: sql`${(users as any).tokenVersion} + 1` })
.where(eq((users as any).id, userId));
}
export async function createRefreshToken(userId: string): Promise<string> {
const token = await new jose.SignJWT({ sub: userId, type: 'refresh' })
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: 'HS256' })
.setIssuedAt()
.setIssuer(JWT_ISSUER)
.setExpirationTime('30d')
.sign(JWT_SECRET);
return token;
}
export async function verifyToken(token: string): Promise<JWTPayload | null> {
/**
* Resolve the authenticated user for a request from its Better Auth session
* cookie, or null when there is no valid session. Suspended/unclaimed/banned
* accounts never get API access even with a live session cookie.
*/
export async function getAuthUser(c: Context): Promise<AuthUser | null> {
try {
const { payload } = await jose.jwtVerify(token, JWT_SECRET, {
issuer: JWT_ISSUER,
audience: JWT_AUDIENCE,
});
return payload as unknown as JWTPayload;
const session = await auth.api.getSession({ headers: c.req.raw.headers });
if (!session?.user) {
return null;
}
const user = session.user as any;
// Suspended (banned) or unclaimed accounts must not retain API access
if (user.banned) {
return null;
}
if (user.accountStatus && user.accountStatus !== 'active') {
return null;
}
return {
id: user.id,
email: user.email,
name: user.name,
phone: user.phone ?? null,
role: user.role ?? 'user',
languagePreference: user.languagePreference ?? null,
isClaimed: Boolean(user.isClaimed),
rucNumber: user.rucNumber ?? null,
accountStatus: user.accountStatus ?? 'active',
emailVerified: Boolean(user.emailVerified),
image: user.image ?? null,
createdAt: user.createdAt,
updatedAt: user.updatedAt,
sessionId: session.session.id,
};
} catch {
return null;
}
}
export async function getAuthUser(c: Context): Promise<any | null> {
const authHeader = c.req.header('Authorization');
if (!authHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
return null;
}
const token = authHeader.slice(7);
const payload = await verifyToken(token);
if (!payload) {
return null;
}
// Never load the password hash into request context — it is only needed for
// explicit password-verification routes that query it separately.
const user = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any)
.select({
id: (users as any).id,
email: (users as any).email,
name: (users as any).name,
phone: (users as any).phone,
role: (users as any).role,
languagePreference: (users as any).languagePreference,
isClaimed: (users as any).isClaimed,
googleId: (users as any).googleId,
rucNumber: (users as any).rucNumber,
accountStatus: (users as any).accountStatus,
tokenVersion: (users as any).tokenVersion,
createdAt: (users as any).createdAt,
updatedAt: (users as any).updatedAt,
})
.from(users)
.where(eq((users as any).id, payload.sub))
);
if (!user) {
return null;
}
// Reject tokens issued before a logout-everywhere / password change
if ((payload.tokenVersion ?? 0) !== (user.tokenVersion ?? 0)) {
return null;
}
// Suspended/unclaimed accounts must not retain API access via an old JWT
if (user.accountStatus && user.accountStatus !== 'active') {
return null;
}
return user;
}
export function requireAuth(roles?: string[]) {
return async (c: Context, next: () => Promise<void>) => {
const user = await getAuthUser(c);
if (!user) {
return c.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, 401);
}
if (roles && !roles.includes(user.role)) {
return c.json({ error: 'Forbidden' }, 403);
}
c.set('user', user);
await next();
};
}
export async function isFirstUser(): Promise<boolean> {
const result = await dbAll(
(db as any).select().from(users).limit(1)
);
return !result || result.length === 0;
}
/** Fetch only the password hash column (never expose via getAuthUser). */
/**
* Fetch only the credential password hash (never exposed via getAuthUser).
* Returns null when the user has no password set (Google-only or unclaimed).
*/
export async function getUserPasswordHash(userId: string): Promise<string | null> {
const row = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any)
.select({ password: (users as any).password })
.from(users)
.where(eq((users as any).id, userId))
.select({ password: (authAccounts as any).password })
.from(authAccounts)
.where(
and(
eq((authAccounts as any).userId, userId),
eq((authAccounts as any).providerId, 'credential')
)
)
);
const hash = row?.password;
return hash && String(hash).length > 0 ? String(hash) : null;
}
/** Whether the user has a linked Google account. */
export async function hasGoogleAccount(userId: string): Promise<boolean> {
const row = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any)
.select({ id: (authAccounts as any).id })
.from(authAccounts)
.where(
and(
eq((authAccounts as any).userId, userId),
eq((authAccounts as any).providerId, 'google')
)
)
);
return !!row;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, vi } from 'vitest';
import { execFileSync } from 'child_process';
import { mkdtempSync } from 'fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'os';
import { join } from 'path';
// Environment must be pinned BEFORE the db/betterAuth singletons are imported
// (dotenv never overrides pre-set values).
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'ba-test-'));
const dbPath = join(dir, 'test.db');
process.env.DB_TYPE = 'sqlite';
process.env.DATABASE_URL = dbPath;
process.env.FRONTEND_URL = 'http://localhost:3002';
process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET = 'integration-test-secret-0123456789abcdef';
delete process.env.REDIS_URL; // memory lockout/rate-limit backends
delete process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID;
// Capture outgoing auth emails (magic links, password resets)
const sentEmails: Array<{ to: string; subject: string; html: string }> = [];
vi.mock('./email.js', () => ({
sendEmail: vi.fn(async (opts: any) => {
sentEmails.push(opts);
}),
emailService: {},
default: {},
}));
let auth: (typeof import('./betterAuth.js'))['auth'];
let db: any;
let sqlite: any;
function lastEmailTo(email: string) {
const found = [...sentEmails].reverse().find((e) => e.to === email);
expect(found, `expected an email sent to ${email}`).toBeTruthy();
return found!;
}
function extractToken(html: string, param = 'token'): string {
const match = html.match(new RegExp(`[?&]${param}=([^"&\\s]+)`));
expect(match, `expected a ${param} in the email link`).toBeTruthy();
return decodeURIComponent(match![1]);
}
function cookieHeaders(setCookie: string | null): Headers {
const sessionPart = (setCookie || '')
.split(/,(?=[^ ;]+=)/)
.map((c) => c.split(';')[0].trim())
.filter((c) => c.includes('session_token'))
.join('; ');
return new Headers({ cookie: sessionPart });
}
beforeAll(() => {
execFileSync('npx', ['tsx', 'src/db/migrate.ts'], {
env: { ...process.env },
stdio: 'pipe',
});
return (async () => {
({ auth } = await import('./betterAuth.js'));
({ db } = await import('../db/index.js'));
const Database = (await import('better-sqlite3')).default;
sqlite = new Database(dbPath);
})();
}, 120_000);
describe('Better Auth integration', () => {
it('makes the first registered user an admin, later users regular', async () => {
const first = await auth.api.signUpEmail({
body: { email: 'admin@test.py', password: 'FirstAdmin1!x', name: 'Admin' },
});
expect((first.user as any).id).toBeTruthy();
const row = sqlite.prepare('SELECT role, is_claimed, account_status FROM users WHERE email = ?').get('admin@test.py');
expect(row.role).toBe('admin');
expect(row.account_status).toBe('active');
await auth.api.signUpEmail({
body: { email: 'user@test.py', password: 'SecondUser1!x', name: 'User' },
});
const row2 = sqlite.prepare('SELECT role FROM users WHERE email = ?').get('user@test.py');
expect(row2.role).toBe('user');
});
it('stores credential passwords as argon2id in auth_accounts, not users', async () => {
const acct = sqlite
.prepare("SELECT a.password FROM auth_accounts a JOIN users u ON u.id = a.user_id WHERE u.email = ? AND a.provider_id = 'credential'")
.get('admin@test.py');
expect(acct.password.startsWith('$argon2id$')).toBe(true);
const user = sqlite.prepare('SELECT password FROM users WHERE email = ?').get('admin@test.py');
expect(user.password).toBeNull();
});
it('rejects passwords that violate the policy', async () => {
// Too short
await expect(
auth.api.signUpEmail({ body: { email: 'weak1@test.py', password: 'Short1!', name: 'W' } })
).rejects.toThrow(/at least 10 characters/);
// Long enough but no character mix (app policy hook)
await expect(
auth.api.signUpEmail({ body: { email: 'weak2@test.py', password: 'alllowercasepw', name: 'W' } })
).rejects.toThrow(/uppercase and lowercase/);
// Common password normalized (policy blocklist)
await expect(
auth.api.signUpEmail({ body: { email: 'weak3@test.py', password: 'Spanglish!', name: 'W' } })
).rejects.toThrow(/too common/);
expect(sqlite.prepare("SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM users WHERE email LIKE 'weak%'").get().n).toBe(0);
});
it('locks an email after 5 failed sign-ins', async () => {
await auth.api.signUpEmail({
body: { email: 'lockout@test.py', password: 'LockoutPass1!', name: 'L' },
});
for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
await expect(
auth.api.signInEmail({ body: { email: 'lockout@test.py', password: 'WrongPass1!x' } })
).rejects.toThrow();
}
// Correct password now also refused: locked
await expect(
auth.api.signInEmail({ body: { email: 'lockout@test.py', password: 'LockoutPass1!' } })
).rejects.toThrow(/Too many login attempts/);
});
it('refuses sign-in for banned (suspended) users and kills nothing else', async () => {
await auth.api.signUpEmail({
body: { email: 'banned@test.py', password: 'BannedPass1!x', name: 'B' },
});
sqlite.prepare("UPDATE users SET banned = 1, account_status = 'suspended' WHERE email = ?").run('banned@test.py');
await expect(
auth.api.signInEmail({ body: { email: 'banned@test.py', password: 'BannedPass1!x' } })
).rejects.toThrow(/suspended|banned/i);
});
it('verifies legacy bcrypt hashes and upgrades them to argon2 on sign-in', async () => {
const bcrypt = (await import('bcryptjs')).default;
const legacyHash = bcrypt.hashSync('LegacyBcrypt1!', 10);
const su = await auth.api.signUpEmail({
body: { email: 'legacy@test.py', password: 'TempPass123!x', name: 'Legacy' },
});
sqlite
.prepare("UPDATE auth_accounts SET password = ? WHERE user_id = ? AND provider_id = 'credential'")
.run(legacyHash, (su.user as any).id);
const si = await auth.api.signInEmail({
body: { email: 'legacy@test.py', password: 'LegacyBcrypt1!' },
});
expect(si.user.email).toBe('legacy@test.py');
// Upgrade happens in the after-hook; poll briefly for it
let upgraded = '';
for (let i = 0; i < 20 && !upgraded.startsWith('$argon2'); i++) {
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 100));
upgraded = sqlite
.prepare("SELECT password FROM auth_accounts WHERE user_id = ? AND provider_id = 'credential'")
.get((su.user as any).id).password;
}
expect(upgraded.startsWith('$argon2id$')).toBe(true);
// And the upgraded hash still verifies
const again = await auth.api.signInEmail({
body: { email: 'legacy@test.py', password: 'LegacyBcrypt1!' },
});
expect(again.user.email).toBe('legacy@test.py');
});
it('magic link signs in existing users but never creates accounts', async () => {
await auth.api.signUpEmail({
body: { email: 'magic@test.py', password: 'MagicPass12!x', name: 'M' },
});
await auth.api.signInMagicLink({
body: { email: 'magic@test.py', callbackURL: '/dashboard' },
headers: new Headers(),
});
const email = lastEmailTo('magic@test.py');
// Emails link to the frontend page, not the raw API endpoint
expect(email.html).toContain('http://localhost:3002/auth/magic-link?token=');
const token = extractToken(email.html);
const verified = await auth.api.magicLinkVerify({
query: { token },
headers: new Headers(),
});
expect((verified as any).user?.email ?? (verified as any).session?.userId).toBeTruthy();
// Unknown email: enumeration-safe success (an email may still go out),
// but verification can never create an account (disableSignUp)
const ghost = await auth.api.signInMagicLink({
body: { email: 'ghost@test.py' },
headers: new Headers(),
});
expect((ghost as any).status).toBe(true);
const ghostEmail = sentEmails.filter((e) => e.to === 'ghost@test.py').pop();
if (ghostEmail) {
const ghostToken = extractToken(ghostEmail.html);
await expect(
auth.api.magicLinkVerify({ query: { token: ghostToken }, headers: new Headers() })
).rejects.toThrow();
}
expect(sqlite.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM users WHERE email = ?').get('ghost@test.py').n).toBe(0);
});
it('completes the guest claim path: magic link session + setPassword', async () => {
// Simulate tickets.ts guest creation: user row, no credential account
const guestId = 'guest-claim-user-000001';
const now = new Date().toISOString();
sqlite
.prepare(
`INSERT INTO users (id, email, password, name, role, is_claimed, account_status, email_verified, banned, token_version, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES (?, ?, NULL, 'Guest', 'user', 0, 'unclaimed', 0, 0, 0, ?, ?)`
)
.run(guestId, 'guest@test.py', now, now);
await auth.api.signInMagicLink({
body: { email: 'guest@test.py', callbackURL: '/auth/claim-account' },
headers: new Headers(),
});
const token = extractToken(lastEmailTo('guest@test.py').html);
const verified = await auth.api.magicLinkVerify({
query: { token },
returnHeaders: true,
headers: new Headers(),
});
const headers = cookieHeaders(verified.headers.get('set-cookie'));
// The session works even while unclaimed (the claim endpoint depends on this)
const session = await auth.api.getSession({ headers });
expect((session?.user as any)?.accountStatus).toBe('unclaimed');
// Set the password (what /api/auth-ext/claim-account does)
await auth.api.setPassword({ body: { newPassword: 'ClaimedPass1!x' }, headers });
const acct = sqlite
.prepare("SELECT password FROM auth_accounts WHERE user_id = ? AND provider_id = 'credential'")
.get(guestId);
expect(acct.password.startsWith('$argon2id$')).toBe(true);
// The claim email uses the claim template with the frontend link
const claimEmail = lastEmailTo('guest@test.py');
expect(claimEmail.subject).toContain('Claim');
expect(claimEmail.html).toContain('callbackURL=%2Fauth%2Fclaim-account');
});
it('password reset revokes existing sessions and applies the new password', async () => {
const su = await auth.api.signUpEmail({
body: { email: 'reset@test.py', password: 'BeforeReset1!x', name: 'R' },
});
const userId = (su.user as any).id;
// A live session from sign-in
await auth.api.signInEmail({ body: { email: 'reset@test.py', password: 'BeforeReset1!x' } });
expect(
sqlite.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM auth_sessions WHERE user_id = ?').get(userId).n
).toBeGreaterThan(0);
await auth.api.requestPasswordReset({
body: { email: 'reset@test.py', redirectTo: '/auth/reset-password' },
});
const email = lastEmailTo('reset@test.py');
// Reset URLs are either .../reset-password/{token}?... or ...?token={token}
const html = email.html;
const pathMatch = html.match(/reset-password\/([^?"&\s]+)/);
const token = pathMatch ? decodeURIComponent(pathMatch[1]) : extractToken(html);
await auth.api.resetPassword({ body: { newPassword: 'AfterReset1!x', token } });
// revokeSessionsOnPasswordReset: true
expect(
sqlite.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM auth_sessions WHERE user_id = ?').get(userId).n
).toBe(0);
await expect(
auth.api.signInEmail({ body: { email: 'reset@test.py', password: 'BeforeReset1!x' } })
).rejects.toThrow();
const after = await auth.api.signInEmail({
body: { email: 'reset@test.py', password: 'AfterReset1!x' },
});
expect(after.user.email).toBe('reset@test.py');
});
it('sessions are stored in auth_sessions with 7-day expiry', async () => {
const si = await auth.api.signInEmail({
body: { email: 'admin@test.py', password: 'FirstAdmin1!x' },
});
const row = sqlite
.prepare('SELECT expires_at FROM auth_sessions WHERE token = ?')
.get((si as any).token);
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
const days = (row.expires_at - Date.now()) / (1000 * 60 * 60 * 24);
expect(days).toBeGreaterThan(6.5);
expect(days).toBeLessThan(7.5);
});
});
+341
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@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
import { betterAuth } from 'better-auth';
import { drizzleAdapter } from 'better-auth/adapters/drizzle';
import { magicLink, admin } from 'better-auth/plugins';
import { APIError, createAuthMiddleware } from 'better-auth/api';
import { eq, and } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db, dbGet, dbAll, isPostgres } from '../db/index.js';
import {
authUsers,
authSessions,
authAccounts,
authVerifications,
authRateLimits,
} from '../db/auth-schema.js';
import { generateId } from './utils.js';
import { hashPassword, verifyPassword, validatePassword } from './passwordPolicy.js';
import { sendEmail } from './email.js';
import { getLoginLockout } from './stores/loginLockout.js';
const isProduction = process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production';
const frontendUrl = process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3002';
const DEFAULT_DEV_SECRET = 'spanglish-dev-only-better-auth-secret';
const rawSecret = process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET;
// Never allow a weak/default secret in production: the secret signs session
// cookies, so a guessable value means forgeable sessions = account takeover.
if (isProduction && (!rawSecret || rawSecret.length < 32 || rawSecret === DEFAULT_DEV_SECRET)) {
throw new Error(
'BETTER_AUTH_SECRET must be set to a strong value (32+ characters) in production. Refusing to start.'
);
}
if (!rawSecret) {
console.warn('[auth] BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is not set; using an insecure development default.');
}
// The site origin plus its www/non-www alias, mirroring the CORS allowlist in
// index.ts. Requests whose Origin is not listed here are rejected by Better
// Auth's CSRF origin check.
function computeTrustedOrigins(): string[] {
const origins = new Set<string>([frontendUrl]);
try {
const url = new URL(frontendUrl);
const alias = url.hostname.startsWith('www.')
? url.hostname.slice(4)
: `www.${url.hostname}`;
origins.add(`${url.protocol}//${alias}${url.port ? `:${url.port}` : ''}`);
} catch {
/* keep frontendUrl as-is */
}
if (process.env.API_URL) origins.add(process.env.API_URL);
return [...origins];
}
// Paths whose request body carries a new password that must satisfy the policy
// (Better Auth's minPasswordLength alone is weaker than the app's policy).
const PASSWORD_SETTING_PATHS = new Set([
'/sign-up/email',
'/reset-password',
'/change-password',
'/set-password',
]);
async function getCredentialAccount(userId: string): Promise<any | null> {
return dbGet<any>(
(db as any)
.select()
.from(authAccounts)
.where(
and(
eq((authAccounts as any).userId, userId),
eq((authAccounts as any).providerId, 'credential')
)
)
);
}
export const auth = betterAuth({
appName: 'Spanglish',
baseURL: process.env.BETTER_AUTH_URL || frontendUrl,
basePath: '/api/auth',
secret: rawSecret || DEFAULT_DEV_SECRET,
trustedOrigins: computeTrustedOrigins(),
telemetry: { enabled: false },
database: drizzleAdapter(db as any, {
provider: isPostgres() ? 'pg' : 'sqlite',
schema: {
user: authUsers,
session: authSessions,
account: authAccounts,
verification: authVerifications,
rateLimit: authRateLimits,
},
// better-sqlite3 cannot run Drizzle's async transactions; operations run
// sequentially instead (also the adapter default).
transaction: false,
}),
advanced: {
cookiePrefix: 'spanglish',
useSecureCookies: isProduction,
ipAddress: {
// Set by the /api/auth/* mount in index.ts from getClientIp(), which
// anchors trust in the TCP peer address (only our own proxies may speak
// for the client via X-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-For). Never read the raw
// forwarded headers here: without the socket they are spoofable, and
// Better Auth would fall back to one shared rate-limit bucket.
ipAddressHeaders: ['x-client-ip'],
},
database: {
// Match the app's existing ID convention (uuid on pg, nanoid on sqlite)
// so Better Auth rows are indistinguishable from legacy rows.
generateId: () => generateId(),
},
},
user: {
additionalFields: {
// `role`, `banned`, `banReason`, `banExpires` come from the admin plugin.
phone: { type: 'string', required: false, input: true },
languagePreference: { type: 'string', required: false, input: true },
rucNumber: { type: 'string', required: false, input: false },
isClaimed: { type: 'boolean', required: false, input: false, defaultValue: true },
accountStatus: { type: 'string', required: false, input: false, defaultValue: 'active' },
},
},
session: {
expiresIn: 60 * 60 * 24 * 7, // 7 days, rolling
updateAge: 60 * 60 * 24, // refresh expiry at most once a day
freshAge: 60 * 60 * 24, // sensitive operations require a session younger than this
// Disabled deliberately: every request validates against the session table,
// so ban/suspend/password-reset revocations apply instantly — and the Go
// photo-api (which reads the same table) can never disagree with us.
cookieCache: { enabled: false },
storeSessionInDatabase: true,
},
emailAndPassword: {
enabled: true,
minPasswordLength: 10,
maxPasswordLength: 128,
autoSignIn: true,
requireEmailVerification: false,
revokeSessionsOnPasswordReset: true,
resetPasswordTokenExpiresIn: 60 * 30, // 30 minutes, matches the legacy flow
sendResetPassword: async ({ user, url }) => {
try {
await sendEmail({
to: user.email,
subject: 'Reset Your Spanglish Password',
html: `
<h2>Reset Your Password</h2>
<p>Click the link below to reset your password. This link expires in 30 minutes.</p>
<p><a href="${url}" style="background-color: #3B82F6; color: white; padding: 12px 24px; text-decoration: none; border-radius: 6px; display: inline-block;">Reset Password</a></p>
<p>Or copy this link: ${url}</p>
<p>If you didn't request this, you can safely ignore this email.</p>
`,
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Failed to send password reset email:', error);
}
},
password: {
// Keep the existing argon2id parameters; legacy bcrypt hashes (migrated
// into auth_accounts) still verify and are upgraded on login below.
hash: (password) => hashPassword(password),
verify: ({ hash, password }) => verifyPassword(password, hash),
},
},
...(process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID
? {
socialProviders: {
google: {
clientId: process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID,
// Not required for ID-token (Google Identity Services) sign-in,
// only for the redirect OAuth flow.
clientSecret: process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET || '',
},
},
}
: {}),
account: {
accountLinking: {
enabled: true,
// Google verifies email ownership, so linking by email is safe — this
// matches the legacy /api/auth/google auto-link behavior.
trustedProviders: ['google'],
},
},
rateLimit: {
// Explicitly enabled so dev behaves like production (off in dev by default).
enabled: true,
window: 60,
max: 100,
// DB-backed rather than Redis: our Redis layer is fail-open by design,
// which is the wrong default for auth rate limiting. The per-email login
// lockout below is already Redis-shared across replicas.
storage: 'database',
modelName: 'rateLimit',
customRules: {
'/sign-in/email': { window: 900, max: 10 },
'/sign-up/email': { window: 900, max: 10 },
'/sign-in/magic-link': { window: 900, max: 5 },
'/magic-link/verify': { window: 900, max: 30 },
'/request-password-reset': { window: 900, max: 5 },
'/reset-password': { window: 900, max: 10 },
'/sign-in/social': { window: 900, max: 20 },
'/change-password': { window: 900, max: 10 },
},
},
databaseHooks: {
user: {
create: {
before: async (user) => {
// First user to register becomes admin (replaces isFirstUser())
const existing = await dbAll<any>((db as any).select().from(authUsers).limit(1));
if (!existing || existing.length === 0) {
return { data: { ...user, role: 'admin' } };
}
},
},
},
},
hooks: {
before: createAuthMiddleware(async (ctx) => {
// Enforce the full password policy (character classes + blocklist) on
// every password-setting path, for both client and server-side calls.
if (PASSWORD_SETTING_PATHS.has(ctx.path)) {
const password = ctx.body?.password ?? ctx.body?.newPassword;
if (typeof password === 'string') {
const result = validatePassword(password);
if (!result.valid) {
throw new APIError('BAD_REQUEST', { message: result.error });
}
}
}
// Per-email lockout: 5 failures / 15 min, Redis-shared when configured.
// Kept as defense-in-depth on top of Better Auth's per-IP rate limits.
if (ctx.path === '/sign-in/email' && typeof ctx.body?.email === 'string') {
const lockout = await getLoginLockout().isLocked(ctx.body.email);
if (lockout.locked) {
throw new APIError('TOO_MANY_REQUESTS', {
message: 'Too many login attempts. Please try again later.',
});
}
}
}),
after: createAuthMiddleware(async (ctx) => {
if (ctx.path !== '/sign-in/email' || typeof ctx.body?.email !== 'string') return;
const email = ctx.body.email as string;
if (ctx.context.returned instanceof APIError) {
// Failed sign-in attempt counts toward the per-email lockout
await getLoginLockout().recordFailure(email);
return;
}
await getLoginLockout().clear(email);
// Transparently upgrade legacy bcrypt hashes to argon2 now that we have
// the verified plaintext. Best-effort: never block the login.
try {
const password = ctx.body?.password;
const userId = (ctx.context.newSession?.user as any)?.id;
if (typeof password === 'string' && userId) {
const account = await getCredentialAccount(userId);
if (account?.password && !String(account.password).startsWith('$argon2')) {
const upgraded = await hashPassword(password);
await (db as any)
.update(authAccounts)
.set({ password: upgraded, updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(eq((authAccounts as any).id, account.id));
}
}
} catch (err: any) {
console.error('[auth] Failed to upgrade legacy password hash:', err?.message || err);
}
}),
},
plugins: [
magicLink({
expiresIn: 60 * 10, // 10 minutes, matches the legacy flow
// Magic links never create accounts (parity with the legacy behavior;
// account creation is register / Google / guest booking only).
disableSignUp: true,
// Hashed at rest: a leaked verification table cannot be replayed.
storeToken: 'hashed',
sendMagicLink: async ({ email, url, token }) => {
// Email a frontend URL (not the raw API verify URL) so the login
// completes on the site, preserving the legacy UX. The page calls
// authClient.magicLink.verify with the token.
let callbackURL = '/';
try {
callbackURL = new URL(url).searchParams.get('callbackURL') || '/';
} catch {
/* default */
}
const link = `${frontendUrl}/auth/magic-link?token=${encodeURIComponent(token)}&callbackURL=${encodeURIComponent(callbackURL)}`;
const isClaim = callbackURL.startsWith('/auth/claim-account');
try {
await sendEmail({
to: email,
subject: isClaim ? 'Claim Your Spanglish Account' : 'Your Spanglish Login Link',
html: isClaim
? `
<h2>Claim Your Account</h2>
<p>An account was created for you during booking. Click below to set up your login credentials. This link expires in 10 minutes.</p>
<p><a href="${link}" style="background-color: #3B82F6; color: white; padding: 12px 24px; text-decoration: none; border-radius: 6px; display: inline-block;">Claim Account</a></p>
<p>Or copy this link: ${link}</p>
<p>If you didn't request this, you can safely ignore this email.</p>
`
: `
<h2>Login to Spanglish</h2>
<p>Click the link below to log in. This link expires in 10 minutes.</p>
<p><a href="${link}" style="background-color: #3B82F6; color: white; padding: 12px 24px; text-decoration: none; border-radius: 6px; display: inline-block;">Log In</a></p>
<p>Or copy this link: ${link}</p>
<p>If you didn't request this, you can safely ignore this email.</p>
`,
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Failed to send magic link email:', error);
}
},
}),
admin({
defaultRole: 'user',
adminRoles: ['admin'],
bannedUserMessage: 'Account is suspended. Please contact support.',
}),
],
});
export type Auth = typeof auth;
+62
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@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
import * as argon2 from 'argon2';
import bcrypt from 'bcryptjs';
// Password hashing with Argon2 (spec requirement)
export async function hashPassword(password: string): Promise<string> {
return argon2.hash(password, {
type: argon2.argon2id,
memoryCost: 65536, // 64 MB
timeCost: 3,
parallelism: 4,
});
}
export async function verifyPassword(password: string, hash: string): Promise<boolean> {
// Support both bcrypt (legacy) and argon2 hashes for migration
if (hash.startsWith('$argon2')) {
return argon2.verify(hash, password);
}
// Legacy bcrypt support
return bcrypt.compare(password, hash);
}
// Small blocklist of common/weak passwords (and obvious app-specific ones).
// Compared case-insensitively after stripping non-alphanumerics so that e.g.
// "P@ssw0rd!" still matches "password".
const COMMON_PASSWORDS = new Set([
'password', 'passw0rd', '123456', '1234567', '12345678', '123456789', '1234567890',
'qwerty', 'qwertyuiop', 'letmein', 'welcome', 'admin', 'administrator', 'iloveyou',
'monkey', 'dragon', 'sunshine', 'princess', 'football', 'baseball', 'abc123',
'spanglish', 'changeme', 'secret', 'master', 'login', 'access',
]);
// Password policy: 10-128 chars, requires a mix of character types, and rejects
// common/weak passwords. Centralized so register/reset/change all share it.
export function validatePassword(password: string): { valid: boolean; error?: string } {
if (password.length < 10) {
return { valid: false, error: 'Password must be at least 10 characters long' };
}
if (password.length > 128) {
return { valid: false, error: 'Password must be at most 128 characters long' };
}
const hasLower = /[a-z]/.test(password);
const hasUpper = /[A-Z]/.test(password);
const hasDigit = /\d/.test(password);
const hasSymbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(password);
// Require lowercase, uppercase, and at least one digit or symbol.
if (!hasLower || !hasUpper || !(hasDigit || hasSymbol)) {
return {
valid: false,
error: 'Password must include uppercase and lowercase letters and at least one number or symbol',
};
}
const normalized = password.toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9]/g, '');
if (COMMON_PASSWORDS.has(normalized)) {
return { valid: false, error: 'Password is too common. Please choose a less guessable password.' };
}
return { valid: true };
}
+87
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@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { getClientIp, isTrustedProxyIp } from './rateLimit.js';
// Minimal Hono-Context stand-in: headers + the node-server env with the
// socket peer address.
function fakeContext(opts: { peer?: string; headers?: Record<string, string> }) {
const headers = new Map(
Object.entries(opts.headers || {}).map(([k, v]) => [k.toLowerCase(), v])
);
return {
req: { header: (name: string) => headers.get(name.toLowerCase()) },
env: opts.peer ? { incoming: { socket: { remoteAddress: opts.peer } } } : {},
} as any;
}
describe('isTrustedProxyIp', () => {
it('trusts loopback and private ranges, including IPv4-mapped IPv6', () => {
expect(isTrustedProxyIp('127.0.0.1')).toBe(true);
expect(isTrustedProxyIp('::1')).toBe(true);
expect(isTrustedProxyIp('::ffff:127.0.0.1')).toBe(true);
expect(isTrustedProxyIp('10.1.2.3')).toBe(true);
expect(isTrustedProxyIp('172.18.0.5')).toBe(true);
expect(isTrustedProxyIp('192.168.1.1')).toBe(true);
});
it('does not trust public addresses or near-miss ranges', () => {
expect(isTrustedProxyIp('203.0.113.7')).toBe(false);
expect(isTrustedProxyIp('172.15.0.1')).toBe(false); // outside 172.16/12
expect(isTrustedProxyIp('172.32.0.1')).toBe(false);
expect(isTrustedProxyIp('1270.0.0.1')).toBe(false);
expect(isTrustedProxyIp('')).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('getClientIp', () => {
it('prefers X-Real-IP when the peer is a trusted proxy', () => {
const c = fakeContext({
peer: '127.0.0.1',
headers: { 'x-real-ip': '203.0.113.7', 'x-forwarded-for': '9.9.9.9' },
});
expect(getClientIp(c)).toBe('203.0.113.7');
});
it('walks X-Forwarded-For from the right past our own proxy hops', () => {
// spoofed prefix, then the real client appended by nginx, then the Next
// proxy hop — the rightmost untrusted entry wins
const c = fakeContext({
peer: '127.0.0.1',
headers: { 'x-forwarded-for': '9.9.9.9, 203.0.113.7, 127.0.0.1' },
});
expect(getClientIp(c)).toBe('203.0.113.7');
});
it('ignores forwarded headers entirely when the peer is untrusted', () => {
// A client hitting the API directly cannot pick its own bucket
const c = fakeContext({
peer: '198.51.100.4',
headers: { 'x-forwarded-for': '9.9.9.9', 'x-real-ip': '8.8.8.8' },
});
expect(getClientIp(c)).toBe('198.51.100.4');
});
it('falls back to the socket address for local traffic with no headers', () => {
expect(getClientIp(fakeContext({ peer: '127.0.0.1' }))).toBe('127.0.0.1');
expect(getClientIp(fakeContext({ peer: '::ffff:127.0.0.1' }))).toBe('127.0.0.1');
});
it('falls back to the socket address when every forwarded hop is internal', () => {
const c = fakeContext({
peer: '127.0.0.1',
headers: { 'x-forwarded-for': '127.0.0.1' },
});
expect(getClientIp(c)).toBe('127.0.0.1');
});
it('rejects junk header values instead of using them as bucket keys', () => {
const c = fakeContext({
peer: '127.0.0.1',
headers: { 'x-forwarded-for': 'not-an-ip; DROP TABLE users' },
});
expect(getClientIp(c)).toBe('127.0.0.1');
});
it('returns "unknown" without a socket address or trusted headers', () => {
expect(getClientIp(fakeContext({}))).toBe('unknown');
});
});
+61 -4
View File
@@ -10,11 +10,68 @@ import { getRateLimiter } from './stores/rateLimiter.js';
* (horizontal scaling). See lib/stores/rateLimiter.ts.
*/
/** Best-effort client IP extraction (honours common reverse-proxy headers). */
// Peers allowed to speak for the client via X-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-For:
// loopback (nginx on the same host, the Next.js proxy) and RFC1918 ranges
// (the docker-compose scale deployment, where nginx is another container).
// Extend with TRUSTED_PROXIES (comma-separated IP prefixes, e.g. "172.20.").
const DEFAULT_TRUSTED_PROXY_PREFIXES = ['127.', '10.', '192.168.', '::1'];
function trustedProxyPrefixes(): string[] {
const extra = (process.env.TRUSTED_PROXIES || '')
.split(',')
.map((s) => s.trim())
.filter(Boolean);
return [...DEFAULT_TRUSTED_PROXY_PREFIXES, ...extra];
}
/** Strip the IPv4-mapped IPv6 prefix so "::ffff:127.0.0.1" matches "127.". */
function normalizeIp(ip: string | undefined | null): string {
const trimmed = (ip || '').trim();
return trimmed.toLowerCase().startsWith('::ffff:') ? trimmed.slice(7) : trimmed;
}
export function isTrustedProxyIp(ip: string): boolean {
const normalized = normalizeIp(ip);
if (!normalized) return false;
if (/^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\./.test(normalized)) return true; // 172.16.0.0/12
return trustedProxyPrefixes().some((prefix) => normalized === prefix || normalized.startsWith(prefix));
}
// Rough shape check so a junk header value can't become a rate-limit key.
function looksLikeIp(value: string): boolean {
return value.length > 0 && value.length <= 45 && /^[0-9a-fA-F.:]+$/.test(value);
}
/**
* Spoof-resistant client IP resolution.
*
* The TCP peer address (via @hono/node-server's env.incoming) anchors the
* trust decision: forwarded headers are only honoured when the direct peer is
* one of our own proxies. X-Real-IP is preferred because nginx overwrites it
* at the edge (deploy/*.conf); X-Forwarded-For is append-only, so it is
* walked from the right past our proxy hops the leftmost entries are
* client-controlled and never trusted on their own.
*/
export function getClientIp(c: Context): string {
const forwarded = c.req.header('x-forwarded-for');
if (forwarded) return forwarded.split(',')[0].trim();
return c.req.header('x-real-ip') || 'unknown';
const socketAddr = normalizeIp((c.env as any)?.incoming?.socket?.remoteAddress);
if (socketAddr && isTrustedProxyIp(socketAddr)) {
const realIp = normalizeIp(c.req.header('x-real-ip'));
if (realIp && looksLikeIp(realIp)) return realIp;
const forwarded = c.req.header('x-forwarded-for');
if (forwarded) {
const chain = forwarded.split(',').map((s) => normalizeIp(s)).filter(Boolean);
for (let i = chain.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (!isTrustedProxyIp(chain[i])) {
return looksLikeIp(chain[i]) ? chain[i] : socketAddr;
}
}
// Every hop is one of ours: a genuinely local/internal client.
}
}
return socketAddr || 'unknown';
}
/**
-684
View File
@@ -1,684 +0,0 @@
import { Hono } from 'hono';
import { zValidator } from '@hono/zod-validator';
import { z } from 'zod';
import { db, dbGet, users, magicLinkTokens, User } from '../db/index.js';
import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
import {
hashPassword,
verifyPassword,
createToken,
createRefreshToken,
isFirstUser,
getAuthUser,
validatePassword,
createMagicLinkToken,
verifyMagicLinkToken,
invalidateAllUserSessions,
bumpTokenVersion,
requireAuth,
getUserPasswordHash,
} from '../lib/auth.js';
import { generateId, getNow, toDbBool } from '../lib/utils.js';
import { sendEmail } from '../lib/email.js';
import { rateLimitMiddleware } from '../lib/rateLimit.js';
import { getLoginLockout } from '../lib/stores/loginLockout.js';
// Per-IP rate limit for sensitive auth endpoints (registration, login, and all
// email-dispatching flows) to curb credential stuffing and email flooding.
const authRateLimit = rateLimitMiddleware({ max: 20, windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, prefix: 'auth' });
// User type that includes all fields (some added in schema updates)
type AuthUser = User & {
isClaimed: boolean;
googleId: string | null;
rucNumber: string | null;
accountStatus: string;
};
const auth = new Hono();
const registerSchema = z.object({
email: z.string().email(),
password: z.string().min(10, 'Password must be at least 10 characters'),
name: z.string().min(2),
phone: z.string().optional(),
languagePreference: z.enum(['en', 'es']).optional(),
});
const loginSchema = z.object({
email: z.string().email(),
password: z.string(),
});
const magicLinkRequestSchema = z.object({
email: z.string().email(),
});
const magicLinkVerifySchema = z.object({
token: z.string(),
});
const passwordResetRequestSchema = z.object({
email: z.string().email(),
});
const passwordResetSchema = z.object({
token: z.string(),
password: z.string().min(10, 'Password must be at least 10 characters'),
});
const claimAccountSchema = z.object({
token: z.string(),
password: z.string().min(10, 'Password must be at least 10 characters'),
});
const changePasswordSchema = z.object({
currentPassword: z.string(),
newPassword: z.string().min(10, 'Password must be at least 10 characters'),
});
const googleAuthSchema = z.object({
credential: z.string(), // Google ID token
});
// Register
auth.post('/register', authRateLimit, zValidator('json', registerSchema), async (c) => {
const data = c.req.valid('json');
// Validate password strength
const passwordValidation = validatePassword(data.password);
if (!passwordValidation.valid) {
return c.json({ error: passwordValidation.error }, 400);
}
// Check if email exists
const existing = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any).select().from(users).where(eq((users as any).email, data.email))
);
if (existing) {
// If user exists but is unclaimed, allow claiming
if (!existing.isClaimed || existing.accountStatus === 'unclaimed') {
return c.json({
error: 'Email already registered',
canClaim: true,
message: 'This email has an unclaimed account. Please check your email for the claim link or request a new one.'
}, 400);
}
return c.json({ error: 'Email already registered' }, 400);
}
// Check if first user (becomes admin)
const firstUser = await isFirstUser();
const hashedPassword = await hashPassword(data.password);
const now = getNow();
const id = generateId();
const newUser = {
id,
email: data.email,
password: hashedPassword,
name: data.name,
phone: data.phone || null,
role: firstUser ? 'admin' : 'user',
languagePreference: data.languagePreference || null,
isClaimed: toDbBool(true),
googleId: null,
rucNumber: null,
accountStatus: 'active',
createdAt: now,
updatedAt: now,
};
await (db as any).insert(users).values(newUser);
const token = await createToken(id, data.email, newUser.role, 0);
const refreshToken = await createRefreshToken(id);
return c.json({
user: {
id,
email: data.email,
name: data.name,
role: newUser.role,
isClaimed: true,
},
token,
refreshToken,
message: firstUser ? 'Admin account created successfully' : 'Account created successfully',
}, 201);
});
// Login with email/password
auth.post('/login', authRateLimit, zValidator('json', loginSchema), async (c) => {
const data = c.req.valid('json');
// Per-email lockout (shared across instances when Redis is configured).
const lockout = await getLoginLockout().isLocked(data.email);
if (lockout.locked) {
return c.json({
error: 'Too many login attempts. Please try again later.',
retryAfter: lockout.retryAfter
}, 429);
}
const user = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any).select().from(users).where(eq((users as any).email, data.email))
);
if (!user) {
await getLoginLockout().recordFailure(data.email);
return c.json({ error: 'Invalid credentials' }, 401);
}
// Check if account is suspended
if (user.accountStatus === 'suspended') {
return c.json({ error: 'Account is suspended. Please contact support.' }, 403);
}
// Check if user has a password set
if (!user.password) {
return c.json({
error: 'No password set for this account',
needsClaim: !user.isClaimed,
message: user.isClaimed
? 'Please use Google login or request a password reset.'
: 'Please claim your account first.'
}, 400);
}
const validPassword = await verifyPassword(data.password, user.password);
if (!validPassword) {
await getLoginLockout().recordFailure(data.email);
return c.json({ error: 'Invalid credentials' }, 401);
}
// Clear failed attempts on successful login
await getLoginLockout().clear(data.email);
// Transparently upgrade legacy bcrypt hashes to argon2 now that we have the
// plaintext and have verified it. Best-effort: a failure here must not block
// the login.
if (!String(user.password).startsWith('$argon2')) {
try {
const upgradedHash = await hashPassword(data.password);
await (db as any)
.update(users)
.set({ password: upgradedHash })
.where(eq((users as any).id, user.id));
} catch (err: any) {
console.error('[auth] Failed to upgrade legacy password hash:', err?.message || err);
}
}
const token = await createToken(user.id, user.email, user.role, user.tokenVersion ?? 0);
const refreshToken = await createRefreshToken(user.id);
return c.json({
user: {
id: user.id,
email: user.email,
name: user.name,
role: user.role,
isClaimed: user.isClaimed,
phone: user.phone,
rucNumber: user.rucNumber,
languagePreference: user.languagePreference,
},
token,
refreshToken,
});
});
// Request magic link login
auth.post('/magic-link/request', authRateLimit, zValidator('json', magicLinkRequestSchema), async (c) => {
const { email } = c.req.valid('json');
const user = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any).select().from(users).where(eq((users as any).email, email))
);
if (!user) {
// Don't reveal if email exists
return c.json({ message: 'If an account exists with this email, a login link has been sent.' });
}
if (user.accountStatus === 'suspended') {
return c.json({ message: 'If an account exists with this email, a login link has been sent.' });
}
// Create magic link token (expires in 10 minutes)
const token = await createMagicLinkToken(user.id, 'login', 10);
const magicLink = `${process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'}/auth/magic-link?token=${token}`;
// Send email
try {
await sendEmail({
to: email,
subject: 'Your Spanglish Login Link',
html: `
<h2>Login to Spanglish</h2>
<p>Click the link below to log in. This link expires in 10 minutes.</p>
<p><a href="${magicLink}" style="background-color: #3B82F6; color: white; padding: 12px 24px; text-decoration: none; border-radius: 6px; display: inline-block;">Log In</a></p>
<p>Or copy this link: ${magicLink}</p>
<p>If you didn't request this, you can safely ignore this email.</p>
`,
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Failed to send magic link email:', error);
}
return c.json({ message: 'If an account exists with this email, a login link has been sent.' });
});
// Verify magic link and login
auth.post('/magic-link/verify', authRateLimit, zValidator('json', magicLinkVerifySchema), async (c) => {
const { token } = c.req.valid('json');
const verification = await verifyMagicLinkToken(token, 'login');
if (!verification.valid) {
return c.json({ error: verification.error }, 400);
}
const user = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any).select().from(users).where(eq((users as any).id, verification.userId))
);
if (!user || user.accountStatus === 'suspended') {
return c.json({ error: 'Invalid token' }, 400);
}
const authToken = await createToken(user.id, user.email, user.role, user.tokenVersion ?? 0);
const refreshToken = await createRefreshToken(user.id);
return c.json({
user: {
id: user.id,
email: user.email,
name: user.name,
role: user.role,
isClaimed: user.isClaimed,
phone: user.phone,
rucNumber: user.rucNumber,
languagePreference: user.languagePreference,
},
token: authToken,
refreshToken,
});
});
// Request password reset
auth.post('/password-reset/request', authRateLimit, zValidator('json', passwordResetRequestSchema), async (c) => {
const { email } = c.req.valid('json');
const user = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any).select().from(users).where(eq((users as any).email, email))
);
if (!user) {
// Don't reveal if email exists
return c.json({ message: 'If an account exists with this email, a password reset link has been sent.' });
}
if (user.accountStatus === 'suspended') {
return c.json({ message: 'If an account exists with this email, a password reset link has been sent.' });
}
// Create reset token (expires in 30 minutes)
const token = await createMagicLinkToken(user.id, 'reset_password', 30);
const resetLink = `${process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'}/auth/reset-password?token=${token}`;
// Send email
try {
await sendEmail({
to: email,
subject: 'Reset Your Spanglish Password',
html: `
<h2>Reset Your Password</h2>
<p>Click the link below to reset your password. This link expires in 30 minutes.</p>
<p><a href="${resetLink}" style="background-color: #3B82F6; color: white; padding: 12px 24px; text-decoration: none; border-radius: 6px; display: inline-block;">Reset Password</a></p>
<p>Or copy this link: ${resetLink}</p>
<p>If you didn't request this, you can safely ignore this email.</p>
`,
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Failed to send password reset email:', error);
}
return c.json({ message: 'If an account exists with this email, a password reset link has been sent.' });
});
// Reset password
auth.post('/password-reset/confirm', authRateLimit, zValidator('json', passwordResetSchema), async (c) => {
const { token, password } = c.req.valid('json');
// Validate password strength
const passwordValidation = validatePassword(password);
if (!passwordValidation.valid) {
return c.json({ error: passwordValidation.error }, 400);
}
const verification = await verifyMagicLinkToken(token, 'reset_password');
if (!verification.valid) {
return c.json({ error: verification.error }, 400);
}
const hashedPassword = await hashPassword(password);
const now = getNow();
await (db as any)
.update(users)
.set({
password: hashedPassword,
updatedAt: now,
})
.where(eq((users as any).id, verification.userId));
// Invalidate all existing sessions/JWTs for security
await invalidateAllUserSessions(verification.userId!);
await bumpTokenVersion(verification.userId!);
return c.json({ message: 'Password reset successfully. Please log in with your new password.' });
});
// Claim unclaimed account
auth.post('/claim-account/request', authRateLimit, zValidator('json', magicLinkRequestSchema), async (c) => {
const { email } = c.req.valid('json');
const user = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any).select().from(users).where(eq((users as any).email, email))
);
if (!user) {
return c.json({ message: 'If an unclaimed account exists with this email, a claim link has been sent.' });
}
if (user.isClaimed && user.accountStatus !== 'unclaimed') {
return c.json({ error: 'Account is already claimed' }, 400);
}
// Create claim token (expires in 1 hour)
const token = await createMagicLinkToken(user.id, 'claim_account', 60);
const claimLink = `${process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'}/auth/claim-account?token=${token}`;
// Send email
try {
await sendEmail({
to: email,
subject: 'Claim Your Spanglish Account',
html: `
<h2>Claim Your Account</h2>
<p>An account was created for you during booking. Click below to set up your login credentials.</p>
<p><a href="${claimLink}" style="background-color: #3B82F6; color: white; padding: 12px 24px; text-decoration: none; border-radius: 6px; display: inline-block;">Claim Account</a></p>
<p>Or copy this link: ${claimLink}</p>
<p>This link expires in 1 hour.</p>
`,
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Failed to send claim account email:', error);
}
return c.json({ message: 'If an unclaimed account exists with this email, a claim link has been sent.' });
});
// Complete account claim
auth.post('/claim-account/confirm', authRateLimit, zValidator('json', claimAccountSchema), async (c) => {
const { token, password } = c.req.valid('json');
const verification = await verifyMagicLinkToken(token, 'claim_account');
if (!verification.valid) {
return c.json({ error: verification.error }, 400);
}
const passwordValidation = validatePassword(password);
if (!passwordValidation.valid) {
return c.json({ error: passwordValidation.error }, 400);
}
const now = getNow();
// Only set a password here. Linking a Google account requires a verified Google
// ID token via /google; we never trust a client-supplied googleId.
const updates: Record<string, any> = {
isClaimed: toDbBool(true),
accountStatus: 'active',
password: await hashPassword(password),
updatedAt: now,
};
await (db as any)
.update(users)
.set(updates)
.where(eq((users as any).id, verification.userId));
const user = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any).select().from(users).where(eq((users as any).id, verification.userId))
);
const authToken = await createToken(user.id, user.email, user.role, user.tokenVersion ?? 0);
const refreshToken = await createRefreshToken(user.id);
return c.json({
user: {
id: user.id,
email: user.email,
name: user.name,
role: user.role,
isClaimed: user.isClaimed,
phone: user.phone,
rucNumber: user.rucNumber,
languagePreference: user.languagePreference,
},
token: authToken,
refreshToken,
message: 'Account claimed successfully!',
});
});
// Google OAuth login/register
auth.post('/google', authRateLimit, zValidator('json', googleAuthSchema), async (c) => {
const { credential } = c.req.valid('json');
try {
// Verify the Google ID token. Google's tokeninfo endpoint validates the
// signature and expiry server-side; we additionally enforce the audience so a
// token minted for a different OAuth client cannot be replayed against us.
const response = await fetch(`https://oauth2.googleapis.com/tokeninfo?id_token=${encodeURIComponent(credential)}`);
if (!response.ok) {
return c.json({ error: 'Invalid Google token' }, 400);
}
const googleData = await response.json() as {
sub: string;
email: string;
name: string;
email_verified: string;
aud?: string;
exp?: string;
};
// email_verified can be returned as boolean true or string "true"
if (String(googleData.email_verified) !== 'true') {
return c.json({ error: 'Google email not verified' }, 400);
}
// Enforce audience when a client ID is configured (closes token-confusion attacks)
const expectedAud = process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID;
if (expectedAud) {
if (googleData.aud !== expectedAud) {
return c.json({ error: 'Invalid Google token audience' }, 400);
}
} else {
console.warn('[auth] GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID is not set; skipping audience verification for Google login.');
}
// Reject expired tokens (defense-in-depth; tokeninfo also rejects them)
if (googleData.exp && Number(googleData.exp) * 1000 < Date.now()) {
return c.json({ error: 'Google token expired' }, 400);
}
const { sub: googleId, email, name } = googleData;
// Check if user exists by email or google_id
let user = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any).select().from(users).where(eq((users as any).email, email))
);
if (!user) {
// Check by google_id
user = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any).select().from(users).where(eq((users as any).googleId, googleId))
);
}
const now = getNow();
if (user) {
// User exists - link Google account if not already linked
if (user.accountStatus === 'suspended') {
return c.json({ error: 'Account is suspended. Please contact support.' }, 403);
}
if (!user.googleId) {
await (db as any)
.update(users)
.set({
googleId,
isClaimed: toDbBool(true),
accountStatus: 'active',
updatedAt: now,
})
.where(eq((users as any).id, user.id));
}
// Refresh user data
user = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any).select().from(users).where(eq((users as any).id, user.id))
);
} else {
// Create new user
const firstUser = await isFirstUser();
const id = generateId();
const newUser = {
id,
email,
password: null,
name,
phone: null,
role: firstUser ? 'admin' : 'user',
languagePreference: null,
isClaimed: toDbBool(true),
googleId,
rucNumber: null,
accountStatus: 'active',
createdAt: now,
updatedAt: now,
};
await (db as any).insert(users).values(newUser);
user = newUser;
}
const authToken = await createToken(user.id, user.email, user.role, user.tokenVersion ?? 0);
const refreshToken = await createRefreshToken(user.id);
return c.json({
user: {
id: user.id,
email: user.email,
name: user.name,
role: user.role,
isClaimed: user.isClaimed,
phone: user.phone,
rucNumber: user.rucNumber,
languagePreference: user.languagePreference,
},
token: authToken,
refreshToken,
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('Google auth error:', error);
return c.json({ error: 'Failed to authenticate with Google' }, 500);
}
});
// Get current user
auth.get('/me', async (c) => {
const user = await getAuthUser(c);
if (!user) {
return c.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, 401);
}
return c.json({
user: {
id: user.id,
email: user.email,
name: user.name,
role: user.role,
phone: user.phone,
isClaimed: user.isClaimed,
rucNumber: user.rucNumber,
languagePreference: user.languagePreference,
accountStatus: user.accountStatus,
createdAt: user.createdAt,
},
});
});
// Change password (authenticated users)
auth.post('/change-password', requireAuth(), zValidator('json', changePasswordSchema), async (c) => {
const user = (c as any).get('user') as AuthUser;
const { currentPassword, newPassword } = c.req.valid('json');
// Validate new password
const passwordValidation = validatePassword(newPassword);
if (!passwordValidation.valid) {
return c.json({ error: passwordValidation.error }, 400);
}
// Verify current password if user has one
const existingHash = await getUserPasswordHash(user.id);
if (existingHash) {
const validPassword = await verifyPassword(currentPassword, existingHash);
if (!validPassword) {
return c.json({ error: 'Current password is incorrect' }, 400);
}
}
const hashedPassword = await hashPassword(newPassword);
const now = getNow();
await (db as any)
.update(users)
.set({
password: hashedPassword,
updatedAt: now,
})
.where(eq((users as any).id, user.id));
// Invalidate all previously issued JWTs so a stolen old token can't outlive the change,
// then hand the current client a fresh token so it stays logged in on this device.
await bumpTokenVersion(user.id);
const refreshedUser = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any).select().from(users).where(eq((users as any).id, user.id))
);
const newToken = await createToken(user.id, user.email, user.role, refreshedUser?.tokenVersion ?? 0);
return c.json({ message: 'Password changed successfully', token: newToken });
});
// Logout - invalidate all previously issued JWTs for this user (logout everywhere)
auth.post('/logout', async (c) => {
const user = await getAuthUser(c);
if (user) {
await invalidateAllUserSessions(user.id);
await bumpTokenVersion(user.id);
}
return c.json({ message: 'Logged out successfully' });
});
export default auth;
+96
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
import { Hono } from 'hono';
import { zValidator } from '@hono/zod-validator';
import { z } from 'zod';
import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { auth } from '../lib/betterAuth.js';
import { validatePassword } from '../lib/passwordPolicy.js';
import { db, dbGet, users } from '../db/index.js';
import { getNow, toDbBool } from '../lib/utils.js';
import { rateLimitMiddleware } from '../lib/rateLimit.js';
// Custom auth flows that Better Auth doesn't provide out of the box. Mounted
// at /api/auth-ext to avoid colliding with Better Auth's /api/auth/* handler.
const authExtRateLimit = rateLimitMiddleware({ max: 20, windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, prefix: 'auth-ext' });
const authExt = new Hono();
const claimAccountSchema = z.object({
password: z.string().min(10, 'Password must be at least 10 characters'),
});
// Complete a progressive-account claim. The user arrives here already holding
// a session established by the claim magic link; this endpoint deliberately
// accepts accountStatus 'unclaimed' sessions (requireAuth would reject them)
// and is the ONLY endpoint that does.
authExt.post('/claim-account', authExtRateLimit, zValidator('json', claimAccountSchema), async (c) => {
const session = await auth.api.getSession({ headers: c.req.raw.headers });
if (!session?.user) {
return c.json({ error: 'Unauthorized. Please use the claim link from your email.' }, 401);
}
const user = session.user as any;
if (user.banned || user.accountStatus === 'suspended') {
return c.json({ error: 'Account is suspended. Please contact support.' }, 403);
}
if (user.isClaimed && user.accountStatus === 'active') {
return c.json({ error: 'Account is already claimed' }, 400);
}
const { password } = c.req.valid('json');
const passwordValidation = validatePassword(password);
if (!passwordValidation.valid) {
return c.json({ error: passwordValidation.error }, 400);
}
// Creates the credential account with the argon2id hash from lib/betterAuth.ts
await auth.api.setPassword({
body: { newPassword: password },
headers: c.req.raw.headers,
});
// The magic link click proved email ownership
await (db as any)
.update(users)
.set({
isClaimed: toDbBool(true),
accountStatus: 'active',
emailVerified: true,
updatedAt: getNow(),
})
.where(eq((users as any).id, user.id));
return c.json({
message: 'Account claimed successfully!',
user: {
id: user.id,
email: user.email,
name: user.name,
role: user.role,
isClaimed: true,
phone: user.phone ?? null,
rucNumber: user.rucNumber ?? null,
languagePreference: user.languagePreference ?? null,
},
});
});
// Whether an email belongs to an unclaimed account. Deliberate, rate-limited
// exception to enumeration-safety, matching the legacy register/login UX that
// surfaced "this account can be claimed".
authExt.get('/claim-eligibility', authExtRateLimit, async (c) => {
const email = c.req.query('email');
if (!email || !z.string().email().safeParse(email).success) {
return c.json({ canClaim: false });
}
const user = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any).select().from(users).where(eq((users as any).email, email))
);
const canClaim = !!user && !user.banned && user.accountStatus !== 'suspended'
&& (!user.isClaimed || user.accountStatus === 'unclaimed');
return c.json({ canClaim });
});
export default authExt;
+85 -59
View File
@@ -1,18 +1,12 @@
import { Hono } from 'hono';
import { zValidator } from '@hono/zod-validator';
import { z } from 'zod';
import { db, dbGet, dbAll, users, tickets, payments, events, invoices, User } from '../db/index.js';
import { db, dbGet, dbAll, users, tickets, payments, events, invoices } from '../db/index.js';
import { eq, desc, and, gt, sql, inArray } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { requireAuth, getUserSessions, invalidateSession, invalidateAllUserSessions, bumpTokenVersion, createToken, hashPassword, validatePassword, getUserPasswordHash } from '../lib/auth.js';
import { generateId, getNow } from '../lib/utils.js';
// User type that includes all fields (some added in schema updates)
type AuthUser = User & {
isClaimed: boolean;
googleId: string | null;
rucNumber: string | null;
accountStatus: string;
};
import { requireAuth, getUserPasswordHash, hasGoogleAccount, validatePassword, type AuthUser } from '../lib/auth.js';
import { auth } from '../lib/betterAuth.js';
import { authSessions, authAccounts } from '../db/auth-schema.js';
import { getNow } from '../lib/utils.js';
const dashboard = new Hono();
@@ -50,7 +44,7 @@ dashboard.get('/profile', async (c) => {
isClaimed: user.isClaimed,
accountStatus: user.accountStatus,
hasPassword,
hasGoogleLinked: !!user.googleId,
hasGoogleLinked: await hasGoogleAccount(user.id),
memberSince: user.createdAt,
membershipDays,
createdAt: user.createdAt,
@@ -423,49 +417,77 @@ dashboard.get('/invoices', async (c) => {
// ==================== Security Routes ====================
// Get active sessions
// Get active sessions (Better Auth session table; validated per-request so
// this list is always live). Session tokens are never exposed to the client.
dashboard.get('/sessions', async (c) => {
const user = (c as any).get('user') as AuthUser;
const sessions = await getUserSessions(user.id);
const sessions = await dbAll<any>(
(db as any)
.select({
id: (authSessions as any).id,
userAgent: (authSessions as any).userAgent,
ipAddress: (authSessions as any).ipAddress,
createdAt: (authSessions as any).createdAt,
updatedAt: (authSessions as any).updatedAt,
expiresAt: (authSessions as any).expiresAt,
})
.from(authSessions)
.where(
and(
eq((authSessions as any).userId, user.id),
gt((authSessions as any).expiresAt, new Date())
)
)
.orderBy(desc((authSessions as any).updatedAt))
);
return c.json({
sessions: sessions.map((s: any) => ({
id: s.id,
userAgent: s.userAgent,
ipAddress: s.ipAddress,
lastActiveAt: s.lastActiveAt,
lastActiveAt: s.updatedAt,
createdAt: s.createdAt,
expiresAt: s.expiresAt,
current: s.id === user.sessionId,
})),
});
});
// Revoke a specific session
// Revoke a specific session. Deleting the row is immediately effective:
// sessions are validated against the table on every request (no cookie cache).
dashboard.delete('/sessions/:id', async (c) => {
const user = (c as any).get('user') as AuthUser;
const sessionId = c.req.param('id');
await invalidateSession(sessionId, user.id);
await (db as any)
.delete(authSessions)
.where(
and(
eq((authSessions as any).id, sessionId),
eq((authSessions as any).userId, user.id)
)
);
return c.json({ message: 'Session revoked' });
});
// Revoke all sessions (logout everywhere). Bumping the token version invalidates
// every previously issued JWT for this user, which is the actual enforcement
// mechanism (auth is stateless JWT, not DB-session based).
// Revoke all other sessions (logout everywhere else); the current session
// stays valid so this device remains signed in.
dashboard.post('/sessions/revoke-all', async (c) => {
const user = (c as any).get('user') as AuthUser;
await invalidateAllUserSessions(user.id);
await bumpTokenVersion(user.id);
// Issue a fresh token so the current device stays signed in
const refreshed = await dbGet<any>(
(db as any).select().from(users).where(eq((users as any).id, user.id))
);
const token = await createToken(user.id, user.email, user.role, refreshed?.tokenVersion ?? 0);
return c.json({ message: 'All other sessions revoked.', token });
await (db as any)
.delete(authSessions)
.where(
and(
eq((authSessions as any).userId, user.id),
sql`${(authSessions as any).id} != ${user.sessionId}`
)
);
return c.json({ message: 'All other sessions revoked.' });
});
// Set password (for users without one)
@@ -476,53 +498,57 @@ const setPasswordSchema = z.object({
dashboard.post('/set-password', zValidator('json', setPasswordSchema), async (c) => {
const user = (c as any).get('user') as AuthUser;
const { password } = c.req.valid('json');
// Check if user already has a password
if (await getUserPasswordHash(user.id)) {
return c.json({ error: 'Password already set. Use change password instead.' }, 400);
}
// setPassword is a server-only Better Auth endpoint, so the HTTP-layer
// policy hook does not cover it — validate explicitly.
const passwordValidation = validatePassword(password);
if (!passwordValidation.valid) {
return c.json({ error: passwordValidation.error }, 400);
}
const hashedPassword = await hashPassword(password);
const now = getNow();
await (db as any)
.update(users)
.set({
password: hashedPassword,
updatedAt: now,
})
.where(eq((users as any).id, user.id));
try {
await auth.api.setPassword({
body: { newPassword: password },
headers: c.req.raw.headers,
});
} catch (err: any) {
return c.json({ error: err?.body?.message || 'Failed to set password' }, 400);
}
return c.json({ message: 'Password set successfully' });
});
// Unlink Google account (only if password is set)
dashboard.post('/unlink-google', async (c) => {
const user = (c as any).get('user') as AuthUser;
if (!user.googleId) {
if (!(await hasGoogleAccount(user.id))) {
return c.json({ error: 'Google account not linked' }, 400);
}
if (!(await getUserPasswordHash(user.id))) {
return c.json({ error: 'Cannot unlink Google without a password set' }, 400);
}
const now = getNow();
await (db as any)
.delete(authAccounts)
.where(
and(
eq((authAccounts as any).userId, user.id),
eq((authAccounts as any).providerId, 'google')
)
);
await (db as any)
.update(users)
.set({
googleId: null,
updatedAt: now,
})
.set({ updatedAt: getNow() })
.where(eq((users as any).id, user.id));
return c.json({ message: 'Google account unlinked' });
});
+13 -4
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { z } from 'zod';
import { db, dbGet, dbAll, tickets, events, users, payments, paymentOptions, eventPaymentOverrides, siteSettings, isSqlite } from '../db/index.js';
import { eq, and, or, sql, inArray } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { requireAuth, getAuthUser } from '../lib/auth.js';
import { generateId, generateTicketCode, getNow, toDbDate, calculateAvailableSeats, isEventSoldOut } from '../lib/utils.js';
import { generateId, generateTicketCode, getNow, toDbDate, toDbBool, calculateAvailableSeats, isEventSoldOut } from '../lib/utils.js';
import { createInvoice, isLNbitsConfigured, LNBITS_INVOICE_EXPIRY_SECONDS } from '../lib/lnbits.js';
import { rateLimitMiddleware } from '../lib/rateLimit.js';
import emailService from '../lib/email.js';
@@ -164,12 +164,15 @@ ticketsRouter.post('/', zValidator('json', createTicketSchema), async (c) => {
user = {
id: userId,
email: data.email,
password: '', // No password for guest bookings
password: null, // No password for guest bookings; set on claim (Better Auth credential account)
name: fullName,
phone: data.phone || null,
role: 'user',
languagePreference: null,
rucNumber,
isClaimed: toDbBool(false),
accountStatus: 'unclaimed',
emailVerified: false,
createdAt: now,
updatedAt: now,
};
@@ -1429,11 +1432,14 @@ ticketsRouter.post('/admin/create', requireAuth(['admin', 'organizer', 'staff'])
user = {
id: userId,
email: attendeeEmail,
password: '',
password: null,
name: adminFullName,
phone: data.phone || null,
role: 'user',
languagePreference: null,
isClaimed: toDbBool(false),
accountStatus: 'unclaimed',
emailVerified: false,
createdAt: now,
updatedAt: now,
};
@@ -1573,11 +1579,14 @@ ticketsRouter.post('/admin/add', requireAuth(['admin', 'organizer', 'staff']), z
user = {
id: userId,
email: attendeeEmail,
password: '',
password: null,
name: fullName,
phone: data.phone || null,
role: 'user',
languagePreference: null,
isClaimed: toDbBool(false),
accountStatus: 'unclaimed',
emailVerified: false,
createdAt: now,
updatedAt: now,
};
+20 -2
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { z } from 'zod';
import { db, dbGet, dbAll, users, tickets, events, payments, magicLinkTokens, userSessions, invoices, auditLogs, emailLogs, paymentOptions, legalPages, siteSettings } from '../db/index.js';
import { eq, desc, sql, and, gte, lte } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { requireAuth } from '../lib/auth.js';
import { authSessions } from '../db/auth-schema.js';
import { getNow, toDbDate } from '../lib/utils.js';
interface UserContext {
@@ -175,11 +176,28 @@ usersRouter.put('/:id', requireAuth(['admin', 'organizer', 'staff', 'marketing',
return c.json({ error: 'User not found' }, 404);
}
// Keep the Better Auth admin `banned` flag in sync with accountStatus so
// sign-in is blocked at the auth layer too, and kill live sessions on
// suspension so it takes effect immediately (sessions are DB-validated on
// every request by both the backend and the photo API).
const statusMirror: Record<string, any> = {};
if (data.accountStatus === 'suspended') {
statusMirror.banned = true;
statusMirror.banReason = 'Suspended by admin';
} else if (data.accountStatus) {
statusMirror.banned = false;
statusMirror.banReason = null;
}
await (db as any)
.update(users)
.set({ ...data, updatedAt: getNow() })
.set({ ...data, ...statusMirror, updatedAt: getNow() })
.where(eq((users as any).id, id));
if (data.accountStatus === 'suspended') {
await (db as any).delete(authSessions).where(eq((authSessions as any).userId, id));
}
const updated = await dbGet(
(db as any)
.select({
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
"skipLibCheck": true,
"outDir": "./dist",
"rootDir": "./src",
"declaration": true,
"declaration": false,
"resolveJsonModule": true
},
"include": ["src/**/*"],